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“For the more we learn about law, the more we grow convinced that nothing im-
portant about it is wholly uncontroversial,” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 10 
(1998). 
Abstract 
Extraterritoriality is a key concept in both public and private international law.  
Yet, scant attention has been given to the jurisprudential underpinnings of extrater-
ritoriality and that of its Achilles’ heel—the enforcement difficulties commonly asso-
ciated with extraterritorial claims. 
To fill this gap, the article undertakes a study of the writings of a selection of lead-
ing legal theorists (Fuller, Kelsen, Hart, Goldsmith, and Posner).  The analysis of 
the findings of that study draws attention to (1) the “dual (or perhaps triple) role of 
law,” (2) the “reputational dimension of extraterritoriality,” (3) the option of “domes-
tic enforceability of extraterritorial claims” through so-called “market destroying 
measures,” and (4) the necessary distinction between “bite jurisdiction” and “bark 
jurisdiction.”  
Stemming from this analysis,, it is proposed that neither the jurisprudential legiti-
macy, nor the practical utility of extraterritorial claims necessarily depend on the 
legal enforceability of those claims.  And that, in any case, also extraterritorial 
clams that cannot be backed up by extraterritorial legal enforcement are, in legal 
positivist terms, backed by sanctions through the possibility of domestic legal en-
forceability of extraterritorial claims.  
Finally, a theoretical framework for assessing extraterritorial claims is presented.  
However, first, to prepare ground for the work described, the concept of extraterrito-
riality is discussed. 
I. Introduction 
The terms “extraterritorial” and “extraterritoriality” are commonly used in the 
context of matters falling within the discipline of public international law.  In 
contrast, one surprisingly rarely finds reference to those terms in writings on 
private international law (or “conflict of laws”).  Yet, at least on a practical level, 
extraterritoriality is as much an issue in private international law as it is in public 
international law.  For example, where a court, in a civil matter, claims jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant based on the fact that the defendant’s writings have been 
read in the country claiming jurisdiction, it is of course making a jurisdictional 
claim with extraterritorial effect. Similarly, when a court in such a case decides to 
apply its domestic law to the foreign conduct by the foreign party, it is giving 
extraterritorial effect to its law.  
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In fact, the centrality of the role played by extraterritoriality is such that it is 
difficult to think of any private international law case of note that does not involve 
some dimension of extraterritoriality.  For example, it is often said that the 
Internet gives rise to controversial jurisdictional issues.  However, there is nothing 
remarkable or controversial about, e.g., a country exercising jurisdiction over an 
Internet dispute involving two of its citizens who have acted within that country.  
Indeed, such a situation can typically be dealt with in the same way whether the 
parties used the Internet or not.  The truth is that it is only where a country seeks 
to exercise jurisdiction over Internet conduct in an extraterritorial manner that the 
remarkable features of the Internet become relevant and that controversies arise.  
In other words, extraterritoriality is the key ingredient in every controversial claim 
of jurisdiction in relation to the Internet.  
The weakness of extraterritoriality emerges with great clarity when one 
approaches private international law, as one should, as a system.  Generally 
speaking, it is relatively uninteresting to, for example, look at rules of choice of law 
without also considering matters of jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement.  The 
weakness of extraterritoriality is that enforcement typically is tied to territorial 
limitations.  It may, quite simply, seem to be useless to state that country A will 
have jurisdiction over matters meeting certain criteria, if practical realities stand 
in the way of the courts of country A ever being able to exercise effective 
jurisdiction in such cases.  Similarly, a claim that country A’s laws apply to 
conduct corresponding to certain fact patterns may be of limited value where 
country A lacks means to enforce its law.  This—the, in Kohl’s masterful 
language,1 “Achilles’ heel” of extraterritoriality—has been used as, and remains, a 
heavy and influential argument against extraterritoriality. 
On the whole, however, insufficient attention has been afforded to the 
jurisprudential underpinnings of extraterritoriality, and indeed, to the 
jurisprudential underpinnings of the mentioned Achilles’ heel.  In fact, discussions 
of the pros and cons of different types of jurisdictional rules rarely go as far as to 
confront the absolutely fundamental question of whether practical enforceability of 
jurisdictional rules is a necessity.  This is a considerable problem since it is 
premature, not to say futile, to design jurisdictional rules for any given context 
before one addresses the question of the extent to which the value of the rules to be 
designed hinges upon their practical enforceability.  It is time we approached the 
jurisprudential legitimacy of extraterritoriality in this context, because until that 
topic has been confronted, no truly informed discussion can take place on the topic 
 
1. UTA KOHL, JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET: REGULATORY COMPETENCE OVER ONLINE ACTIVITY 
26 (2007). 
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of extraterritoriality. 
It is this latter question I will engage with here.  In more detail, my aim is to 
approach extraterritoriality from a jurisprudential perspective in order to assess 
whether the commonly assumed lack of effective enforcement, or lacking effective 
enforceability, render extraterritorial claims practically pointless, jurisprudentially 
illegitimate and/or, as also has been argued, even dangerous. 
In doing so, the point of departure will be a study of what a selection of leading 
legal theorists (Fuller, Kelsen, Hart, Goldsmith, and Posner) have said about the 
necessity of enforcement or enforceability of law generally. In analyzing the 
findings of that study, I draw attention to (1) the “dual (or perhaps triple) role of 
law,” (2) the “reputational dimension of extraterritoriality,” (3) the option of 
“domestic enforceability of extraterritorial claims” through so-called “market 
destroying measures,” and (4) the distinction between “bite jurisdiction” and “bark 
jurisdiction.”  From that, it is proposed that neither the jurisprudential legitimacy 
nor the practical utility of extraterritorial claims necessarily depend on the legal 
enforceability of those claims.  And that, in any case, extraterritorial clams that 
cannot be backed up by extraterritorial legal enforcement are, in legal positivist 
terms, backed by sanctions through the possibility of domestic legal enforceability 
of extraterritorial claims.  
Finally, I proceed to outline a theoretical framework for assessing and guiding 
extraterritorial claims.  However, first, to prepare ground for the discussion to 
come, I will say a few words about extraterritoriality as such. 
The reader should note that the discussion will be largely focused on Internet 
related issues—the latest, and perhaps most interesting, arena on which the fight 
about extraterritoriality is taking place.  However, much of what is said ought to 
be of more general application as well. 
II. The Concept of Extraterritoriality2 
While many may suppose extraterritoriality to be a modern phenomenon, this is 
not so.  In fact, extraterritoriality has a long history indeed: 
In seeking the origin of extraterritoriality, some jurists and 
historians trace it to the imperialistic period of the last century. 
Others find the origin of this jurisdiction in the “letters of 
privilege” which the Greek Christian rulers at Constantinople, and 
later their Moslem conquerors, issued to the city republics of Italy 
in the 11th and 12th centuries. Again, others trace it to the period 
of the Roman Empire. Quite a few writers, on the other hand, seem 
 
2. This part draws and expands upon the discussion of the concept of extraterritoriality presented in: 
DAN SVANTESSON, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DATA PRIVACY LAW 83-88 (2007). 
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to be satisfied with the obviously less troublesome assumption, 
that the original document concerning extraterritoriality is to be 
found in the treaty of 1535 between the Franks and the Turks.  
It is the writer's opinion that the origin of extraterritorial 
privileges has to be traced much earlier even than the period of 
early Rome and the Germanic tribes. Traces are found in the more 
ancient world. The principle of territorial law and sovereignty was 
unknown in the ancient world. It was even vague in the Middle 
Ages. In fact, kingdoms during the medieval period had vague and 
uncertain boundaries. Indeed, even during the first centuries of 
what we call modern history, no such conceptions as territorial law 
or territorial sovereignty were entertained. Sovereignty was not 
associated with dominion over a territory. It was a tribe-
sovereignty. . . .  Early man stood in great fear of the magic of 
strangers. He resorted to a variety of ceremonies in order to protect 
himself against the devilish power of the stranger. But in the 
course of time the natives were convinced that this attitude of 
strict exclusiveness could not be permanently maintained. As soon 
as they failed to find in their own association the satisfaction of 
their desires and the supply of their wants, they were compelled to 
go beyond it and enter into relations of some sort with the 
surrounding world. The alien, therefore, was incapable of 
amenability to the same jurisdiction to which the natives were 
subjected. For this reason we find that in the ancient world 
foreigners were either subjected to their own laws and customs or 
were placed under a special jurisdiction. It is in these relations and 
under these conditions that we find the earliest traces of 
extraterritoriality.3  
In any case, put simply, jurisdictional claims are either territorial or 
extraterritorial, with the latter type often described as relating to “the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a State over activities occurring outside its borders.”4  In light of 
modern communications technology, such a division is, however, prone to lead the 
mind into a quagmire of confusion and errors.  For example, is a State exercising 
jurisdiction “over activities occurring outside its borders” where it regulates the use 
of personal information about its citizens stored in a cloud computing arrangement 
with multi-jurisdictional reach?  The focus on the location of the activities is 
causing unnecessary complications for the purpose of ascertaining whether a 
jurisdictional claim is extraterritorial or not. 
In light of this, we would do well to search for an alternative definition.  A better 
 
3. Shalom Kassan, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Ancient World, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 239-40 
(1935) (footnotes omitted). 
4. Deborah Senz & Hilary Charlesworth, Building Blocks: Australia’s Response to Foreign 
Extraterritorial Legislation, 2 MELB. J. INT’L L. 69, 72 (2001). 
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definition would make clear that an assertion of jurisdiction is extraterritorial as 
soon as it seeks to control or otherwise directly affect5 the activities of an object 
(person, business, etc.) outside the territory of the State making the assertion—
persons, whether legal or natural, are always located somewhere, while locating 
“activities” is much more difficult.  Importantly, extraterritoriality cannot depend 
on whether the primary intention of the claim is aimed at actors within the 
territorial limits of a State or not.  Thus, for example, a prescriptive jurisdiction 
primarily aimed domestically may also still be extraterritorial in nature to the 
extent that it controls or otherwise directly affects the activities of an object 
(person, business, etc.) outside the territory of the State.  Consider, for example, 
the spatial scope of application of Singapore’s recently introduced Personal Data 
Protection Act 2012 (the “Act”).6     
Unlike proposed drafts of this Act, in its final form it lacks an express claim of 
extraterritoriality.  However, the true state of things cannot be ascertained merely 
by reference to what is expressly stated in the Act.  Article 13, for example, states 
that “An organisation shall not . . . collect, use or disclose personal data about an 
individual unless (a) the individual gives, or is deemed to have given, his consent 
under this Act to the collection, use or disclosure, as the case may be.”7 The proper 
application of this provision can only be understood in light of how Article 2(1) 
defines the term “organisation:” “‘organisation’ includes any individual, company, 
association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, whether or not — (a) 
formed or recognised under the law of Singapore; or (b) resident, or having an office 
or a place of business, in Singapore.”8 
Read together, it is clear that even with a presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the actual extraterritoriality of the Personal Data Protection 
Act 2012 hinges upon how one identifies the location of the data collection.  If 
collection is deemed to take place where the data subject is located, there is no 
doubt that Article 13 may have extraterritorial effect in that it regulates the 
conduct of organizations lacking a place of business in Singapore.  After all, not 
least with modern communication technologies, foreign organizations may well 
collect personal data in Singapore from abroad. 
Assuming that collection in such a case will be held to take place in Singapore, 
denying the extraterritorial effect of the Act by reference to the fact that no express 
claim of extraterritoriality is made is, in my view, unsustainable.  To put it in a 
 
5. The form this direct effect takes will obviously depend on the type of jurisdiction—prescriptive, 
investigative, judicial, or enforcement—the matter relates to. 
6. Personal Data Protection Act (Act No. 26/2012)(Sing.). 
7. Id. at art. 13.  
8. Id. at art. 2(1). 
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clear but somewhat silly manner: If you deem a cat to be a dog, and state that dogs 
are not allowed, you are regulating cats even though you do not say so. 
Thus, we can get out of the definition quagmire and regain firm ground only if 
we realize that the two definitions noted above in fact refer to two different 
matters.  The definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction as “the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a state over activities occurring outside its borders” refers to the 
exercise of jurisdiction being extraterritorial as such, while the latter definition 
focuses on whether the exercise of jurisdiction (that may well, but need not, be 
extraterritorial) has any extraterritorial effect or implications.  An example may be 
illustrative.  
On one occasion, an Austrian court claimed jurisdiction over a French skier in a 
child-support dispute based on the fact that the Frenchman had property in 
Austria (the property in question was a pair of boxer shorts the skier had, 
presumably accidentally, left behind in an Austrian hotel room).9  In this case, the 
Court was not exercising jurisdiction over activities—or in Kelsen’s terms, 
conditioning facts—occurring outside its borders and thus, the exercise of 
jurisdiction was not extraterritorial as such.  However, the exercise of jurisdiction 
certainly had extraterritorial effect and implications.  
This example re-emphasizes that to focus on whether the exercise of jurisdiction 
by a State is over activities occurring outside its borders is highly artificial, as the 
same extraterritorial effect can be achieved whether one anchors it in territorial 
jurisdictional connecting points or extraterritorial such points.  
At any rate, it has been widely acknowledged that assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction are increasing in frequency in the 21st century, with reasons such as 
increased travel and technological developments commonly pointed to as the 
driving forces behind this increase.10  Further, the international community’s 
desire to punish certain types of criminal activities seems to promote acceptance of 
extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction.11 
Further, it is also of relevance to consider the reasons why States opt in favor of 
extraterritoriality.  In their insightful paper Global Reach, Local Grasp: 
Constructing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization,12 a group of 
scholars consider extraterritoriality from a Canadian perspective, and in doing so, 
 
9. Hans-Bertram Nothnagel, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards in West 
Germany 17 VA. J. INT’L L. 385, 393 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
10. See, e.g., Danielle Ireland-Piper, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arm of the 
Law Undermine the Rule of Law?, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
11. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg) (Int’l Ct. Justice Feb. 14, 
2002). 
12. See generally Steve Coughlan et al., Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization, 6 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007). 
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they identify four “observable motivations for acting extraterritorially” in the 
context of criminal law: “(1) to regulate extraterritorial conduct with a strong 
connection to [the State claiming jurisdiction]; (2) to control the ‘public face’ of [the 
State claiming jurisdiction];  
(3) to avoid lawless territory; and (4) to implement international agreements 
regarding particular offenses [or other matters].”13 
These “observable motivations” ought to be relevant also from a non-Canadian 
perspective and outside the context of criminal law.  However, as useful as this 
observation is, it is no doubt incomplete.  We must add at least one observable 
motivation for acting extraterritorially.  States may act extraterritoriality in order 
to affect a result in another state because that result is desirable for, e.g., (a) the 
world order, (b) the people of that other state, or (c) the people of the first state. 
The discussion above about the concept of extraterritoriality ought to be largely 
uncontroversial.  However, before moving on to the more substantive parts of this 
article, I want to stress my concerns about the concept of extraterritoriality as 
such.  First of all, the discussion above makes clear that it is not always possible to 
draw a sharp line between what is territorial and what is extraterritorial.  
Although I suggest that we instead focus on ‘extraterritorial effect’ I hasten to 
acknowledge that it will not always be easy, perhaps not even possible, to draw 
sharp lines between occasions of such extraterritorial effect, and occasions not 
involving such an effect.  Second, even if we were able to distinguish between what 
is territorial and what is extraterritorial, what would such a distinction tell us? I 
am afraid that the answer is that this distinction tells us disappointingly little. 
After all, an extraterritorial jurisdictional claim may, in certain circumstances be 
undisputedly legitimate, while in other circumstances, such a claim may be 
undisputedly illegitimate.  Combined, these two fundamental impairments 
arguably render the concept of extraterritoriality impotent. 
Despite this serious reservation, in order to avoid distracting from the 
discussion to be had, the article proceeds by adhering to the tradition of treating 
the concept of extraterritoriality as important, meaningful, and reasonably well-
defined.             
III. Some Leading Theories and Theorists 
Anyone embarking on the perilous journey of seeking to summarize the 
thoughts of our leading legal theorists is well advised to start the journey by 
proclaiming some important caveats.  First, it must be acknowledged that I 
obviously will only be able to focus on certain fragments of the rich and nuanced 
 
13. Id. at 32. 
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legal landscapes painted by the theorists I examine.  None of the theorists I focus 
on dealt exclusively, or indeed always directly, with the issue of extraterritoriality.  
Second, there is no denying that the subjectivity of the selection of which 
fragments one focuses on puts one at risk of misrepresenting the complexity, and 
indeed direction, of the theories one discusses.  Third, this latter problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that at least some of the theorists examined developed 
their thoughts over time so as to render a situation where the theory of person A at 
time point T1 is slightly different to the same person’s theory at time point T2.  
And finally, the very selection of which theorists to include, and which to exclude, 
is in itself a perilous exercise, leaving the person making the selection vulnerable 
to criticism; after all, the subjectivity of such an exercise is undeniable, and it will 
always be possible to question the choices made.  On this point, I merely wish the 
reader to be mindful of the impossibility of addressing every single theory and 
theorist that may be of relevance.  Thus, my defense, should one be needed, is that 
upon the acceptance of that fact, basing the selection on my subjective impression 
of where the most can be gained must surely be acceptable, not least as I do not 
seek to hide or veil the subjectivity.14  
 
14. This is not to suggest that the process of selecting which theorists to focus on has been an 
easy one. It was, for example, with much hesitation and regret that I, in the end, decided to 
exclude Rorty, McCormick, and Dworkin from my scope of study. In many ways, Dworkin has 
been the most interesting of the contemporary legal philosophy scholars. His writings cover 
many different questions and it almost feels negligent not to include his work here. Having 
said that, it is clearly the case that Dworkin has not addressed the topic under scrutiny in this 
paper in an as direct manner as some of the other legal philosophers dealt with here.  
  Yet, examples can of course be found in Dworkin’s writings that could be examined in the 
context of extraterritoriality. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 109 (1998) (“[A] difference 
between the question what the law is and the question whether judges or any other official or 
citizen should enforce or obey the law.”). While Dworkin’s discussion here is focused on 
situations where judges arguably should “ignore the law and try to replace it with better law,” 
id., this separation between law and enforcement must reasonably mean that law, including 
law with an extraterritorial effect, may be law also in the absence of enforcement; that 
enforcement is not, in a general sense, a necessary component of law.  
  On an even more abstract level, it is highly interesting to consider another observation he 
made in LAW’S EMPIRE. See id. at 113 (“It would make no sense to debate how far law should 
be obeyed if one side thought that the enactments of Parliament were the only source of law 
and the other side gave that power to the Bible.”).  
  While uttered in a context completely different from ours, this statement is illustrative 
indeed for our purposes. In fact, it could be seen to go to the core of the problem of 
extraterritoriality. The source of law of the country making an extraterritorial claim is 
different from the sources of law of the countries affected by the extraterritorial claim. Thus, 
perhaps it makes no sense to debate how far the laws of the first state should be obeyed by the 
people in other states. Perhaps, this is the wrong enquiry all together. But of course, any such 
conclusion begs the question: then what is the “right” enquiry to make? To avoid straying too 
far from the main theme of this article, I will quietly retreat from this question here. 
However, it is no doubt a haunting questions and I hope to return to it in future research. 
  One possibility, which I cannot explore in any detail here, is that the focus ought to be 
placed on similarities and differences in the domestic laws of different countries. Where 
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Despite these caveats, I suspect the admittedly somewhat eclectic selection and 
analysis of the works of Fuller, Kelsen, Hart, Goldsmith, and Posner below will 
provide some valuable insights for any analysis of the jurisprudential aspects of 
extraterritoriality.    
It is striking indeed that theorists from such varied backgrounds as those 
discussed here—representing natural law theory, hard legal positivism, soft legal 
positivism, and rational choice theory—stand relatively, and surprisingly, united 
in their views on the role the law’s enforceability plays for its jurisprudential 
legitimacy.  
A. Lon L. Fuller 
Harvard professor Lon L. Fuller is an important advocate for the broad and 
diverse natural law theory.  In 1964, he published THE MORALITY OF LAW—one of 
the most influential legal theory books in the 20th century. 
Fuller is perhaps most famous for having identified eight “distinct routes to 
disaster” in law-making: 
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, 
so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis.  The other 
routes are: (2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make available to 
the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse 
of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, 
but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it 
puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to 
make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory 
rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the 
affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules 
that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and finally, (8) a 
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their 
actual administration.15 
Fuller is discussing these matters from the perspective of a domestic legal 
system.  Here, I will, however, consider Fuller’s eight routes of disaster from the 
perspective of the legal landscape facing an average Internet user of today.  That 
landscape is not limited to one domestic legal system.  Thus, I think it useful to put 
forward the concept of a “contextual legal system,” by which I refer to the system of 
 
sufficient progress is made in eliminating key contradictions between different legal systems, 
we may not need to approach extraterritorial claims from the perspective of how far the laws 
of the state making the extraterritorial claim should be obeyed by the people in other states. 
Rather we may consider whether the extraterritorial claim reasonably should activate the 
application of the domestic law rules that are sufficiently similar to the rules of the 
extraterritorial claim.    
15. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1969). 
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legal rules from all sources that purport to apply to the conduct of the person in 
question.  I shall, for the moment, not explore that topic any further, as it will find 
a more congenial environment in the text below.    
The first route to disaster—a failure to achieve rules at all—may at a first 
glance seem irrelevant for our context.  However, with the lightning speed of 
technology development, constituting a sharp contrast to the glacier-like speed 
with which legal rules and principles develop, there is an endless challenge of 
novel legal conundrums to which the application of established rules and principles 
often is uncomfortable, and sometimes the producer of the most awkward results.16  
The law typically resorts to technology-neutral legal rules to overcome this issue.  
However, time and time again, we are confronted with situations in which 
technology-neutral rules cause problems specifically because of their technology-
neutral structure—they end up being applicable where, and in a manner, they 
arguably should not be.17  In such situations courts applying the rules must adopt 
what I elsewhere have termed a “consequence-focused approach”— meaning that 
attention must be given to the search for the option having the most favorable 
consequences for the future.18  One example of this can be seen in Sweden v. Bodil 
Lindqvist.19 There, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clearly 
 
16. See Christopher Kuner et al., Editorial: The (Data Privacy) Law Hasn't Even Checked in When 
Technology Takes off, 4 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 175, 175-76 (2014). 
17. See CHRIS REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE 189-204 (2012), for a detailed discussion of 
technology-neutral rules. See Lee A. Bygrave, Information Concepts in Law: Generic Dreams 
and Definitional Daylight, OXFORD J. LEGAL S. 1-30 (2014), for a particularly interesting 
discussion of technology-neutral rules, which, among other things, seeks to recalibrate the 
regulatory principle of technology neutrality.   
18. See, e.g., Dan Svantesson, What is “Law,” if “the Law” is Not Something That “Is?”: A Modest 
Contribution to a Major Question, 26(3) RATIO JURIS 456 (2013). This concept is related to, but 
in part distinct from, the teachings of utilitarianism and rationalism. It may also, in 
Dworkin’s terms, be viewed as a species of a progressive view of the role of judges:  
The most popular opinion [the conservative opinion], in Britain and the United States, in-
sists that judges should always, in every decision, follow the law rather than try to improve 
upon it. . . . Some people take the contrary view [the progressive opinion] that judges 
should try to improve the law whenever they can, that they should always be political in 
the way the first answer deplores. The bad judge, on the minority view, is the rigid ‘me-
chanical’ judge who enforces the law for its own sake with no care for the misery or injus-
tice or inefficiency that follows.  
 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 14, at 8. 
 Perhaps my “consequence-focused approach” is best viewed as falling between these two 
extremes, although a great deal closer to the minority view than to the conservative majority 
view. Under my version, judges should not “always” seek to improve the law, but should do so 
where doing so is justified on balance. 
19. There, a woman—Bodil Lindqvist—uploaded a website on which she made available personal 
information about herself and her husband, as well as personal information relating to a 
number of her colleagues in the church community she worked for. The website, which was 
published without the permission of her colleagues, generated some complaints and the 
matter ended up in court. The legal proceedings related to a range of matters. Interestingly, 
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based an important aspect of its decision on the consequences their decision would 
have: 
If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean that there 
is “transfer [of data] to a third country” every time that personal 
data are loaded onto an internet page, that transfer would 
necessarily be a transfer to all the third countries where there are 
the technical means needed to access the internet. The special 
regime provided for by Chapter IV of the directive would thus 
necessarily become a regime of general application, as regards 
operations on the internet. Thus, if the Commission found, 
pursuant to Article 25(4) of Directive 95/46, that even one third 
country did not ensure adequate protection, the Member States 
would be obliged to prevent any personal data being placed on the 
internet.20 
In contrast, sometimes courts do not so clearly consider, or appreciate, the 
consequences of their decisions.  For example, it could be said that in Google 
Spain21 the CJEU opted for a rather more strict literal interpretation of the same 
Directive, perhaps underestimating the tremendous consequences that flow from 
such an interpretation.22  
 
one of them was whether Lindqvist’s conduct meant she had transferred the data in question 
to a third country. Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992 (Nov. 6, 
2003), ¶ 69, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num 
=79968893C1901 0101&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance= ARRET.   
20. Id. 
21. Case C-131/12, Google v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (Spain), 2013 E.C.R. ___, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-131/12. 
22. When Spanish citizen Mario Costeja González, via a Google search, found links to two (for 
him unflattering) pages of the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia from 1998, he requested 
that the newspaper remove the personal information about him contained in the relevant 
pages. He also requested that Google Spain and Google, Inc. remove or conceal the personal 
data relating to him, so that the data no longer appeared in the search results and in the links 
to La Vanguardia. The CJEU held that a search engine is responsible for its search results 
completely independently of the possible liabilities of the publishers, such as the newspaper in 
this case. Thus, even if certain content, such as the newspaper reporting relating to Mr. 
Costeja González, can lawfully be uploaded to the Internet, it may be unlawful for a search 
engine to list such content in its search results. 
  The most serious aspect of the judgment relates to the so-called “right to be forgotten.” The 
Court concluded that where search results appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer 
relevant, or excessive, the information and links contained in the list of results must be 
erased. This applies even where the information is true and published lawfully by third 
parties. In other words, the Court places on Google the burden of deciding whether search 
results have become outdated. Id. 
  The practical difficulties with this conclusion are obvious. First, there is the risk of search 
engines erring on the side of caution and removing any content complained of. After all, the 
risks of not removing the content may easily outweigh any perceived advantage of keeping the 
content accessible. Second, content may be seen to be outdated and irrelevant on one date, 
only to become highly relevant again at a later date. 
  This decision has the potential to fundamentally change the Internet, and its full implications 
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As serious as the above is, the second route to disaster is of even greater concern 
for our specific discussion here.  The second route to disaster is a failure to 
publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party the rules it is expected 
to observe.  Of course, we should remind ourselves that Fuller’s focus here was on a 
domestic context.  However, in our increasingly globalized world such a focus may 
no longer suffice.  
So, which rules are we dealing with here?  For the average Internet user posting 
content online the relevant rules are all those rules that make a claim of being 
applicable to the Internet user’s conduct.  In my experience, the rules of most legal 
systems contain at least some provisions with extraterritorial effect.  Thus, to 
avoid Fuller’s second route to disaster, all such domestic legal systems would need 
to publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules it is expected 
to observe.  Some countries, like Australia, provide comprehensive free-of-charge 
legal databases such as that of the Australasian Legal Information Institute.23  
However, first of all, not all countries do so, and second, for many domestic legal 
systems there are language barriers that to-date render legal databases 
inaccessible to foreigners. 
Importantly, Fuller points out that, “[t]he need for this education [the education 
of citizens as to the content of the laws that apply to them] will, of course, depend 
upon how far the requirements of law depart from generally shared views of right 
and wrong.”24  It is easy to agree with this proposition, and the implications it has 
for the current discussion should be obvious to everyone.  The laws we are exposed 
to when acting online are diverse and come from virtually all domestic legal 
systems in the world.  The fact that those rules will then include concepts and 
principles that are different from the concepts and principles of right and wrong 
generally shared within our respective communities is beyond intelligent dispute. 
I hasten to acknowledge that it is utopian to wish for a situation where every 
person is aware of every rule she is expected to follow in every legal system she is 
exposed to.  Indeed, Fuller goes as far as to conclude that “[i]t would in fact be 
 
remain to be seen. 
  While displeased with the label “literal interpretation,” Dworkin describes it in the 
following terms:  
It proposes that the words of a statute be given what we might better call their acontextual 
meaning, that is, the meaning we would assign them if we had no special information 
about the context of their use or the intentions of their author. This method of interpreta-
tion requires that no context-dependent and unexpressed qualifications be made to general 
language. 
 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 14, at 17-18. 
23. AUSTRALASIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.austlii.edu.au/ (last visited Mar. 24, 
2015). 
24. FULLER, supra note 15, at 50. 
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foolish to try to educate every citizen into the full meaning of every law that might 
conceivably be applied to him.”25  However, the fact remains that the global reach 
of Internet communications has placed the legal system on a route to disaster for 
the average Internet user.  Even if it was the case, and it is not, that countries 
made all their laws available online, language barriers and difficulties in locating 
the laws (not to mention understanding them) will defeat even the Internet user 
keenest to abide by all applicable laws.  Unfortunately, this fact, despite being 
widely recognized on a superficial level, has been ignored in substance for too 
long.26 
As the third and fourth27 potential routes to disaster have no implications 
specific to extraterritoriality, we can now turn to the fifth—the enactment of 
contradictory rules.  Again, I recognize that Fuller here spoke of contradictory 
rules within one and the same domestic legal system, but for an Internet user the 
relevant legal system could be seen to be made up of a combination of all those 
legal rules from various domestic legal systems that purport to apply to her 
actions.  After all, for that Internet user all those legal rules dictate what she can 
and cannot do; combined, they represent her contextual legal system.  Where this 
is accepted, the existence of contradictory rules will come as no surprise.  This may 
be seen to represent a departure from what Fuller was addressing, and it may well 
be that Fuller would not condone the expansion of the concept of “legal system” I 
am advocating here.  In light of that, I make no claim here to be applying Fuller’s 
framework as such.  Rather, I am drawing upon it to illustrate a point that so far 
has gained little or no attention—the need to redefine the concept of “legal system” 
in light of the globalization caused by the Internet, and by current approaches to 
extraterritoriality.  
We may here pause to consider a significant issue relating to contradictory 
 
25. Id. at 49. 
26. One of the relatively few scholars that have given attention to this problem is Kohl. Importantly, 
she concludes that:  
The reality is that the global village lacks key “notice” mechanisms—such as common 
knowledge and knowledge hotspots—which in the domestic context play a central role ei-
ther in bringing rules to the attention of their subjects or in relieving them of knowing 
them. States have a responsibility and a self-interest in bringing their rules home to online 
actors if they expect compliance with them. Any realistic debate on Internet governance, 
and in particular on the legal obligations of online actors under foreign law, must be sensi-
tive to these more subtle concerns.  
 KOHL, supra note 1, at 162. 
27. Most commentators, including Fuller himself, recognize that no matter how hard we work to 
make rules understandable, we may not reach perfection. For example, as noted by Dworkin “[o]f 
course the virtues of clarity and precision are ideals normally fulfilled only to a degree.” Ronald 
Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law: Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller’s Novel 
Claims, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668, 678 (1965). 
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rules.  Although differences exist between different countries, private international 
law has a long tradition of drawing a rather sharp line between what it sees as 
“true conflicts” and what it merely views as “false conflicts.”28  Alternatively, as 
expressed by Justice Souter, “[n]o conflict exists, . . . ‘where a person subject to 
regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.’”29 
Assertions such as that made by Justice Souter have particular relevance in the 
context of extraterritoriality, as they lend support to the idea of dealing with 
contradictory standards by enforcing the strictest of those standards.  However, as 
I have expressed elsewhere,30 I object to this duties-focused approach.  Essentially, 
what Justice Souter and others are saying is that we should only focus on the 
duties imposed by law.  If the duties do not conflict, the laws do not conflict.  
In my view, this is too simplistic a perspective, as it completely neglects the 
importance of the rights that laws provide.  Importantly, the correlative 
relationship between rights and duties we may be accustomed to from a domestic 
law setting does not necessarily survive when transplanted into a cross-border 
environment; that is, rights provided under one country’s legal system may not 
necessarily create corresponding duties under other legal systems.  
I argue that in assessing whether two (or more) laws are in conflict we need to 
take account of both the duties and the rights those laws provide for.  In other 
words, even where the duties do not clash, the rights of one country may clash with 
the duties of another country.  
The difference can be illustrated by way of an example I have used on several 
occasions.31  Imagine that the laws of state A specifically provide for a right of 
religious freedom, while the laws of state B specifically impose a duty of adherence 
to Norse pagan faith.  Where a person, for one reason or another, finds herself 
bound to comply with both the laws of state A and those of state B, there is no 
conflict in the view of the reasoning put forward by Justice Souter and others—
such a person can comply with the law of both states by adhering to Norse pagan 
faith.  In contrast, from the perspective I advocate here, there is a conflict since the 
right provided by the law of state A cannot be freely exercised while at the same 
time complying with the duty imposed by the law of state B (except of course by 
those who voluntarily chose to exercise their right to worship Odin, Thor, Freja, 
etc.). 
 
28. See, e.g., REID MORTENSEN ET AL., PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 197 (2d ed. 2011). 
29. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory, 39 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 101, 134 
(1998). 
30. See, e.g., Dan Svantesson, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An International Law Perspective of 
the Difficult Position of Globally Active Internet Intermediaries, 30 COMPU. L. & SEC. REV. 348, 
348-56 (2014). 
31. Id. 
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In light of this, we may draw two distinct conclusions of great importance.  First, 
it is clear that contradictory rules—that under this view include clashes between 
rights of one country with duties of another country—are common indeed.  Second, 
it shows that calls for compliance with the strictest rules, as a solution to the 
problem of conflicting laws, are misguided. 
For our discussion, the sixth of Fuller’s routes to disaster is related to the second 
as well as the fifth, and focuses on rules that require conduct beyond the powers of 
the affected party.  So what is required for us to follow the laws we are exposed to 
when, e.g., posting things online?  First of all, we need to know all laws of all 
countries that claim to regulate our conduct: that is, all the laws of the contextual 
legal system that applies to us.  Second, we do not have the power to conduct 
ourselves in a manner that pleases both legal systems, where two systems require 
us to do two opposing things.  From this, it seems possible to conclude that if we 
accept that “a law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and no 
law: and it is impossible to obey contradictions, or act according to them,”32 we 
have reached a stage where at least some foreign law is not law for us, even where 
it claims to apply to our conduct.  
Such a conclusion is no doubt uncomfortable for some.  However, I submit that it 
is inevitable unless we are willing to accept the conclusion that we either must 
avoid posting online altogether, or more sensibly must geographically restrict 
online postings33 unless we are sure they are benign worldwide. 
We must also consider Fuller’s seventh route to disaster—introducing such 
frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them.  
Viewing the relevant rules as all those rules that any legal system purports to 
apply to Internet users’ conduct, there is no doubt that the legal landscape Internet 
users are exposed to goes through frequent changes, perhaps to the degree of 
invoking Fuller’s seventh route to disaster. 
Finally, the eighth route to disaster seems to bear the greatest relevance for our 
discussion of extraterritoriality.  Where a law is announced but not (sufficiently) 
enforced—as is often the case with extraterritorial claims—there may well be said 
to be a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.  Yet, none of the examples and extensive discussions Fuller 
provides about this route to disaster directly relate to situations where the lacking 
 
32. FULLER, supra note 15, at 33 (quoting Chief Justice Vaughn’s decision in Thomas v. Sorrell, 124 
Eng. Rep. 1098 (K.B.) (1677) (Eng.)). 
33. See, e.g., Dan Svantesson, Time for the Law to Take Internet Geo-Location Technologies Seriously, 
8 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 473, 473 (2012). Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal 
Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567, 569 
(2012). Dan Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of Placing Borders on the 
“Borderless” Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 101 (2004). 
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enforcement is due to severe enforcement difficulties, which, of course, is the most 
commonplace explanation of enforcement failures in the context of 
extraterritoriality.  Instead, his focus is on situations where the failure of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration is due 
to “mistaken interpretation, inaccessibility of the law, lack of insight into what is 
required to maintain the integrity of a legal system, bribery, prejudice, 
indifference, stupidity, and the drive towards personal power.”34    
However, the temptation to conclude that Fuller does not here intend to deal 
with lacking enforcement due to severe enforcement difficulties is problematic to 
maintain upon a reading of THE MORALITY OF LAW as a whole.  Fuller’s distaste for 
discrepancies between the law as written and the law as enforced in practice comes 
to clearer expression later on in his classic text.  In discussing the law’s attitude 
towards homosexuality, he concludes: 
I would, however, have no difficulty in asserting that the law ought 
not to make it a crime for consenting adults to engage privately in 
homosexual acts.  The reason for this conclusion would be that any 
such law simply cannot be enforced and its existence on the books 
would constitute an open invitation to blackmail, so that there 
would be a gaping discrepancy between the law as written and its 
enforcement in practice.35   
The possibility of blackmail is, of course, not an issue, for example, in the 
context of extraterritorial jurisdictional claims.  So, one may here be induced to 
question whether Fuller would maintain his concern independent of the risk of 
blackmail.  However, any such doubt evaporates some pages later in THE 
MORALITY OF LAW when he confronts the issue of the legality of contraceptives: 
If, as sometimes seems to be the case, laws prohibiting the sale of 
contraceptives are kept on the books as a kind of symbolic act, with 
the knowledge that they will not and cannot be enforced, legal 
morality is seriously affected.  There is no way to quarantine this 
contagion against a spread to other parts of the legal system.  It is 
unfortunately a familiar political technique to placate one interest 
by passing a statute, and to appease an opposing interest by 
leaving the statute largely unenforced.36 
A clearer articulation of his distaste for lacking enforcement of legal rules is 
scarcely needed.  But Fuller’s harsh stance on this matter leaves him vulnerable to 
criticism. 
First, it would perhaps have been warranted for Fuller to explain, by reference 
 
34. FULLER, supra note 15, at 81. 
35. Id. at 133. 
36. Id. at 153. 
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to his routes to disaster, why such lacking enforcement offends his “legal morality.”  
As far as I can tell, the only possibility for Fuller would be to refer to his eighth 
route to disaster—namely, that of a failure of congruence between the rules as an-
nounced and their actual administration.  Yet, surely the inability to enforce with 
perfection a legal rule does not offend legal morality.  Consider, for example, rules 
against domestic violence.  There can be no doubt that the enforcement of such le-
gal rules is falling well short of perfection.37  Indeed, such laws have only slightly 
better prospect of effective enforcement than do laws making it a crime for consent-
ing adults to engage privately in homosexual acts.  Thus, the dedicated pupils of 
Fuller’s school must reasonably have no difficulty in asserting that the law ought 
not to make domestic violence a crime.  Yet, any such assertion is, of course, wholly 
unsatisfactory. 
Furthermore, Fuller neglects to provide any examples of the contagion of lack-
ing enforcement in one area of law spreading to other parts of the legal system.  In 
fact, evidence to the contrary is plentiful.  The inherent difficulty in enforcing 
speed limits on our roads has not resulted in lacking enforcement of rules restrict-
ing anti-competitive behavior, and the fact that the effective extraterritorial reach 
of data privacy law is limited has not caused lawlessness in corporate merger situ-
ations.  The list of such examples could probably be made endless. 
Here, it is also interesting to consider the implications of Fuller’s insistence on 
viewing his eight routes to disaster as making up an inner morality of law.  Many 
commentators, such as Hart and Dworkin, have objected to this description of the 
eight routes to disaster, preferring instead to recognize them as matters of “effica-
cy.”38  And even after reading Fuller’s vigorous defense on this matter,39 it may be 
tempting to adopt a more pragmatic approach and view them as matters of proce-
dural fairness, or perhaps as eight practicalities of law, corresponding with, but not 
for that sake constituting, morality.40  
 
37. See, e.g., Laura Dugan, Domestic Violence Legislation: Exploring its Impact on the Likelihood of 
Domestic Violence, Police Involvement, and Arrest, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 283, 299 (2003) 
(suggesting that the “dark figure” in domestic violence—the difference between what happens and 
what is reported—is about the same as the number of incidents known to the police). 
38. FULLER, supra note 15, at 200-02. 
39. Id. at 200-24. 
40. In the words of Dworkin:  
It is morally wrong for an official to harm a citizen groundlessly, to insult him unfairly, or 
to accuse him unjustly. Those occasions of defying the canons which involve such acts are 
occasions of moral wrongdoing, but they are so because they have these consequences and 
not because the canons are themselves moral standards.  
 Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law, supra note 27, at 674-75. Having said this, it is quite 
possible, likely even, that at least some of Fuller’s eight routes to disaster are easier to defend as 
an inner morality in the context of extraterritoriality, than it is in relation to law more generally. I 
will, however, not explore that question further here. 
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Either way, Fuller’s insistence on reference to morality is of great significance 
for our discussion here, as it can be seen to signal that only immoral violations of 
his eight guiding principles are objectionable.  Surely, it cannot be immoral to fail 
to enforce a law if the failure is due to the contextual impossibility of enforcing the 
law.  At this point, I can imagine Fuller’s disciples intervening that it may, howev-
er, be immoral to introduce law where one knows that one will not be able to en-
force it.  But responding to such an objection is easily done by reference to the ex-
ample of domestic violence laws introduced above; certainly, Fuller would not 
suggest that it is immoral to introduce a law against domestic violence just because 
the prospect of effective enforcement is limited in practice.  I am quite aware that 
Fuller does not explicitly embrace this farfetched proposition.  But I ask in all seri-
ousness, what tenet of his philosophy, what principle or standard enunciated by 
him, offers a stopping place short of this ultimate reductio ad absurdum of Fuller's 
point of view?    
Finally on this topic, it is hard to understand why Fuller would place a particu-
larly high threshold of acceptability on the degree of enforcement.  After all, a cor-
nerstone feature of his reasoning is the recognition of law as “a complex undertak-
ing capable of various degrees of success.”41  This clearly supports imperfect 
enforcement of law, such as is commonplace in the context of extraterritorial 
claims of jurisdiction.  Indeed, in relation to his third route to disaster—i.e., 
through retroactive legislation—Fuller goes as far as to acknowledge that retroac-
tive legislation may in fact be necessary in certain situations.42  It would then seem 
odd if Fuller’s theory demanded absolute, or even near, perfection in enforcement 
to avoid violating his eight routes to disaster. 
  
Taken as a whole, the above signals that unless we smarten up the way in 
which extraterritorial claims are made online, we are, in Fuller’s view, on at least 
one, but possibly six, “routes to disaster,” with a result worse than bad law, a result 
Fuller describes as “something that is not properly called a legal system at all.”43  
One final observation must be made as to how Fuller’s reasoning relates to the 
concept of extraterritoriality.  Fuller recognizes that more than one legal system 
may govern a particular group of people.  Acknowledging this may reasonably be 
seen as a necessary condition for the possibility of approving of 
extraterritoriality.44  And indeed, Fuller goes as far as to remind us that in history 
 
41. FULLER, supra note 15, at 157. 
42. Id. at 53. 
43. Id. at 39. 
44. The only alternative being that one views a subject as governed only by the law with 
extraterritorial effect, and not by the law of the country within which the subject is located. 
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multiple systems have been more common than unitary systems.45  He goes on to 
note: “Historically dual and triple systems have functioned without serious friction, 
and when conflict has arisen it has often been solved by some kind of voluntary 
accommodation.”46 
In this context, it is worth paying close attention to how Fuller suggests, like 
some other commentators before him,47 that law involves an element of 
commitment by the lawgiver to the subjects.  He objects to a conception of law as a 
one-way projection of authority and favors instead an interactional view of law—
“the functioning of a legal system depends upon a cooperative effort – an effective 
and responsible interaction – between lawgiver and subject.”48  But how does that 
work when the person a law purports to bind is not a citizen of the state making 
the law?  What form does that cooperative effort take where a country makes an 
extraterritorial jurisdictional claim purporting to regulate the conduct of persons 
all around the world?  Fuller gives us no hints as to how we should respond to such 
dilemmas.  Others have, however, made much, I think too much, of the potential 
implications of this cooperative effort of law: 
Under basic democratic principles and norms, government must 
rest upon the consent of the governed.  Outsiders may not dictate 
the law to a political community that has not consented to it.  But 
extraterritorial laws do exactly that: they force foreigners (i.e., 
those beyond the state's territorial borders) to bear the costs of 
domestic regulation, even though they are nearly powerless to 
change those regulations.49  
 
This option, however, can be dismissed in its unrealistic bizarreness. 
45. FULLER, supra note 15, at 123. 
46. Id. at 124. 
47. Fuller, for example, refers to the work of the German sociologist Georg Simmel. Id. at 216-17. 
48. Id. at 219 (“I have been emphasizing that obedience to rules loses its point if the man subject to 
them knows that the rule maker will not himself pay any attention to his own enactments.”). This 
statement gives us occasion to draw a distinction between situations where, on the one hand, the 
rule maker fails to properly enforce the law, and on the other hand, situations where the rule 
maker deliberately contravenes laws regulating its conduct. I think Fuller’s statement relates to 
the latter situation rather than the former. This conclusion is perhaps supported by the fact that 
Fuller proceeds to state:  
The converse of this proposition must also be kept in mind, namely, that the rule maker 
will lack any incentive to accept for himself the restraints of the Rule of Law if he knows 
that his subjects have no disposition, or lack the capacity, to abide by his rules; it would 
serve little purpose, for example, to attempt a juristic ordering of relations among the in-
mates of a lunatic asylum.  
 Id. 
49. Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1456, 1483-
84 (2008) (internal footnotes omitted). See also Richard Wolin, The Idea of Cosmopolitanism: 
From Kant to the Iraq War and Beyond, 3 ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 143, 152 n.1 (2010) (“My 
external and rightful freedom should be defined as a warrant to obey no external laws except 
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This assertion has a ring of exaggeration and paradox, if not falsity; it attempts 
to paint in black and white a colorful landscape with plenty of nuances.  Should 
this statement be read to mean that we can never be governed by the legal rules of 
systems other than the legal system of the country, or countries (in the case of dual 
citizenships), of which we are citizens with the right to vote in democratic 
elections?  Surely, no one would suggest something quite so absurd.  After all, it 
would mean that we need not abide by the legal rules of countries we visit, as we 
have no right to partake in elections in those countries.  So how can the statement 
above be read down to better conform with reality?  A better, but still odd, 
interpretation is that country A may not make law for country B.  But this is just a 
truism that adds little to the debate about extraterritoriality, as few, if any, states 
attempt to make law for foreigners lacking connection to the law making state.  
The reality is, of course, that countries making extraterritorial claims justify the 
effect those claims have on foreigners by pointing to the foreigners having 
consented to be so governed by acting in a manner that brings them within the 
reach of the extraterritorial claim.  In light of all this, whether we can or cannot 
change the legal rules we are exposed to may not reasonably be determinative for 
the jurisprudential legitimacy of the extraterritorial claim.50  
 
those to which I have been able to give my own consent.”) (quoting Immanuel Kant, Perpetual 
Peace, POLITICAL WRITINGS 99 (1970))). A related, but considerably more balanced and nuanced, 
proposition was recently put forward by Dworkin:  
In a world of strong and increasing economic interdependencies, however, people’s lives 
may be more affected by what happens in and among other countries than by what their 
own community decides. Dignity seems to require that people everywhere be permitted to 
participate in some way—even if only in some minimal way—in the enactment and admin-
istration of at least those policies that threaten the greatest impact on them. 
 Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 18 (2013). I 
suggest that the primary value of this observation for our context is that until we find an 
appropriate manner to permit people everywhere to participate in some way—even if only in some 
minimal way—in the enactment and administration of those policies that threaten the greatest 
impact on them, states and courts ought to restrict the best they can the regulatory spill-over 
effect they may have onto the people of other countries. On a practical level, this may, for 
example, take the form of courts ensuring that a judgment restricting certain Internet content to 
be blocked is only effective within the country in which the court sits. 
50. Here, it is appropriate to pause to consider one of the key arguments presented by leading 
Cyber Law professor Chris Reed. One of his interesting claims is that: “A governance system 
is legitimate if it is accepted by the relevant community as an appropriate mechanism for 
making rules to govern the activity, and the community also accepts that these rules are 
devised in an appropriate way.” Chris Reed, Governance in Cloud Computing, QUEEN MARY 
UNIV. L. 8 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353764. 
  One can have no quarrel with this statement if read literally—such a governance system 
would indeed appear legitimate. However, reading the statement in the context of what else 
Professor Reed is writing on the matter, it is seems he is suggesting that only where a 
governance system meets his test is it legitimate. Many interesting discussions could be had 
about such an assertion. To avoid straying too far from the main aim of this section, I will 
restrain myself to only making the following observation.I wonder whether Professor Reed 
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In any case, as I canvass in some detail below, it is my view that where carefully 
crafted and sensibly applied, extraterritorial claims need not necessarily offend 
democratic principles and norms. 
B. Hans Kelsen   
Hans Kelsen, most famous for his so-called Pure Theory of Law (a cornerstone 
in some positivist legal theory), was a leader in several academic disciplines, 
including legal theory, political philosophy, social theory, and international 
relations.  Consequently, it is only natural that his writings provide a rich well for 
us to draw upon in our discussion of extraterritoriality.51  Indeed, so many aspects 
of his writings could be brought into the discussion that it is difficult to know 
where to start.  One possible starting point is found in his discussion of “validity” of 
law on the one hand, and “efficacy” of law on the other hand.  In Kelsen’s 
terminology:  
Validity of law means that the legal norms are binding, that men 
ought to behave as the legal norms prescribe, that men ought to 
obey and apply the legal norms.  Efficacy of law means that men 
actually behave as, according to the legal norms, they ought to 
behave, that the norms are actually applied and obeyed.52  
 
does not here overlook, or undervalue, the legitimacy-creating role of conflict of laws rules. It 
is generally not the case that states claim the right to regulate the entire Internet. They claim 
the right to regulate Internet activities that have some form of contact with that state. 
Admittedly, the conflict of laws rules used to delineate what contact suffices are imperfect, but 
that matters not if we are only concerning ourselves with the aims of such rules. Thus, in my 
view, it is not a question of lacking legitimacy in a general sense; questions of legitimacy only 
arise where the conflict rules are so poorly structured to claim jurisdiction where the contacts 
are too weak. In all other situations, the complexity stems from the simple practical fact that 
in cross-border interactions, more than one state has legitimate claims to regulate the 
conduct—there is not necessarily anything wrong in that both the country where the shot was 
fired and the country where the bullet kills express an interest in the murder. In fact, there 
may well be a duty to do so. And what level of acceptance by the relevant community must be 
demonstrated to give legitimacy to the country seeking to regulate the relevant activities? 
Just like when addressing the concerns about democratic principles and norms, we may ask 
whether it is enough if the person travels there despite not having voting rights there. Surely 
it is. So what if you are selling product to people of a foreign country? Or publishing 
something dealing with people there? Does that suffice as an expression of acceptance of the 
governance system of the foreign country? Here it is not easy to draw sharp lines, and I 
suggest we again need to fall back on the design of conflicts rules rather than make it an 
either-or matter of legitimacy. 
51. In fact, with his impressive productivity (Kelsen published almost 400 separate works, including 
numerous books), it is quite simply impossible to properly do justice to his work. See BRIAN BIX, 
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 57 (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed. 2009). Here, I approach 
Kelsen’s work primarily from the perspective of what arguably may be seen as his magnum opus, 
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg, trans., 2011). 
52. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 39.  
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The first of these propositions, in particular, is associated with severe difficulties 
when immersed in a conflict of laws scenario.  Imagine, for example, that a person 
in the U.S. is considering whether or not to place a particular statement on his 
website.  Imagine further that while lawful in the U.S., the publication of such a 
statement would be deemed defamatory under, e.g., the laws of Australia.  Ought 
that man behave as the Australian legal norms prescribe?  Ought that man obey 
and apply the Australian legal norms?  The answer to both these question depends 
of a multitude of factors, but surely a negative answer to those questions cannot 
reasonably lead to the conclusion that the Australian law is not valid.53     
In addition, the discussion of validity and efficacy could usefully be 
supplemented by the introduction of an additional term: that is, enforceability.  
This is important, as enforceability—i.e., the law being applied where it ought to 
be applied—is only one cause for efficacy (as is illustrated below).  It would then 
become clear that Kelsen’s description of efficacy unduly conflates and equates two 
separate things: a norm being applied on the one hand, and people behaving in 
accordance with the norm on the other hand.  As has been stressed many times by 
a diverse range of scholars, people may well behave in accordance with a particular 
norm without doing so because of the norm.  Indeed, they may be completely 
ignorant of the norm and yet behave in accordance with it.  Thus, we need to keep 
efficacy (people behaving in accordance with a norm) separate from enforceability 
(the norm being applied and obeyed). 
Nevertheless, having stressed the difference between validity of law and efficacy 
of law, Kelsen points to what he sees as “a very important relationship between the 
two:”54 
A norm is considered to be valid only on the condition that it 
belongs to a system of norms, to an order which, on the whole, is 
efficacious.  Thus, efficacy is a condition of validity; a condition, not 
the reason of validity.  A norm is not valid because it is efficacious; 
it is valid if the order to which it belongs is, on the whole, 
efficacious.55 
Given the enforcement difficulties discussed above, this statement could be used 
as ammunition against extraterritoriality.  But whether such a use is appropriate 
or not depends entirely on what is viewed as the relevant “system of norms” that 
“on the whole” needs to be efficacious.  Kelsen explains that the legal order is a 
 
53. Unless, of course, one limits the conclusion to saying that the negative answer means that the 
Australian legal norms are not valid in the U.S. in the circumstances of the scenario at hand. Or 
perhaps more usefully, the Australian legal norms are not valid in the contextual legal system 
due to their clash with the U.S. legal norms. 
54. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 42. 
55. Id. 
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system of norms and traces the interrelation between norms in a manner that 
takes him to a “basic norm” as the source binding together each system of norms: 
A norm the validity of which cannot be derived from a superior norm we call a 
“basic” norm.  All norms whose validity may be traced back to one and the same 
basic norm form a system of norms, or an order.  This basic norm constitutes, as a 
common source, the bond between all the different norms of which an order 
consists.  That a norm belongs to a certain system of norms, to a certain normative 
order, can be tested only by ascertaining that it derives its validity from the basic 
norm constituting the order.56 
While it may be doubted that agreement can always be found on what 
constitutes the relevant “basic norm” in any given context, in light of this, almost 
all norms with extraterritorial effect must be seen as being part of systems of 
norms that, on the whole, are efficacious.  For example, Swedish law, as a system 
of norms is, on the whole, efficacious, which means that norms with 
extraterritorial effect within Swedish law are “valid” in Kelsen’s meaning of the 
word, even where they cannot always be enforced.      
A somewhat more serious attack on extraterritoriality found in Kelsen’s 
writings relates to the limits he sees time and space impose on norms: 
Since norms regulate human behaviour, and human behaviour 
takes place in time and space, norms are valid for a certain time 
and for a certain space. . . .  In order to be valid at all, it must be 
valid, not only for a certain time, but also for a certain territory.  
The norms of French law are valid only in France, the norms of 
Mexican law only in Mexico.  We may therefore speak of the 
temporal and the territorial sphere of validity of a norm.57 
This links into my objection to the definition of validity above and provides 
Kelsen’s answer to my questions.  Judging by the quote above, it may be imagined 
that Kelsen would say that the Australian norms in my example are valid in 
Australia, but not valid in the U.S.  But is that really an accurate reflection of how 
one state approaches the laws of a foreign state?  If we consider that a court in one 
state may well end up applying the law of another state, Kelsen’s views on this 
seem to clash with reality established by observation. 
However, as any student of Kelsen would be aware, Kelsen does not perceive 
any application of foreign law.  Instead, he sees the foreign norms as being 
incorporated into the system of norms of the state that applies them:  
The true meaning of the rules of so-called private international law 
is: that the law of a State directs its organs to apply to certain 
 
56. Id. at 111. 
57. Id. at 42. 
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cases norms which are norms of the State’s own law, but which 
have the same contents as corresponding norms of another State’s 
law.58  
Whatever approach one takes to the above, Kelsen’s definition may be reconciled 
with reality if by “validity” he actually means “applicability;” that is, if he meant to 
say that the norms of French law are applicable only in France, the norms of 
Mexican law only in Mexico.  But where does this leave us in relation to the 
jurisprudential legitimacy of extraterritoriality?  Under Kelsen’s “principle of 
legitimacy,” the validity of legal norms “is determined only by the order to which 
they belong.”59  If his reference to “validity” is in fact, as is suggested here, a 
reference to “applicability,” then this suggests that only the state introducing a 
norm can determine the applicability of that norm.  This speaks in favor of the 
validity of norms with extraterritorial effect.  Of course, I hasten to stress that this 
conclusion only holds true if, indeed, the link between “validity” and “applicability” 
holds true. 
Another aspect of Kelsen’s writings that must not be overlooked in the 
discussion of the jurisprudential legitimacy of extraterritoriality is his discussion of 
“desuetudo.”  “Desuetudo” is, according to Kelsen, “the negative legal effect of 
custom.”60  Kelsen states that: 
Within a legal order which as a whole is efficacious there may 
occur isolated norms which are valid and which yet are not 
efficacious, that is, are not obeyed and not applied even when the 
conditions which they themselves lay down for their application 
are fulfilled.  But even in this case efficacy has some relevance to 
validity.  If the norm remains permanently inefficacious, the norm 
is deprived of its validity by “desuetudo.”61 
Few relevant norms with extraterritorial effect are likely to meet the combined 
criteria of being “not obeyed,” “not applied,” and “permanently inefficacious” so as 
to render them deprived of validity by desuetudo. 
Kelsen’s well-known adoption of monism with international law supremacy62 
also lends support for extraterritoriality.  In the words of Spaak, Kelsen argues 
that “there are no, and cannot be any, sovereign states that are independent of 
international law, because it was international law, and international law only, 
that recognized them as states in the first place.”63  From this follows, as Spaak 
 
58. Id. at 245. 
59. Id. at 117. 
60. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 119. 
61. Id. 
62. See also Torben Spaak, Kelsen on Monism and Dualism, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231530. 
63. Id. at 12. 
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points out, that “any state that is recognized by international law will only be as 
sovereign as international law allows it to be.”64  Given that international law (in 
particular, customary international law) recognizes extraterritoriality in certain 
circumstances,65 Kelsen must thus be seen to be endorsing extraterritoriality, at 
least to the full extent allowed under customary international law.    
Kelsen’s view on extraterritoriality is perhaps most clearly discernible in his 
discussion of the international legal order’s limitation of the territorial sphere of 
validity of national legal orders.  In this context, Kelsen explains: 
Actually, it is not impossible that a general or individual norm of 
the legal order of a certain State should prescribe that a coercive 
act shall be carried out within the territory of another State, and 
that an organ of the former State should execute this norm.  But 
should such a norm be enacted or executed, the enactment of the 
norm and its execution, that is, the performance of the coercive act 
within the territory of the other State, would be illegal.  The legal 
order violated by these acts is the international law.66 
This amounts to a strong opposition to extraterritoriality.  However, and of 
great significance, Kelsen is here only referring to the extraterritorial performance 
of a coercive act.  In contrast, he does not object to extraterritoriality generally: 
That the validity of the national legal order is restricted by the 
international legal order to a certain space, the so-called territory 
of the State, does not mean that the national legal order is 
authorized to regulate only the behavior of individuals living 
within this space.  The restriction refers in principle only to the 
coercive acts provided by the national legal order and the 
procedure leading to these acts.  The restriction does not refer to 
all the conditioning facts to which the legal order attaches coercive 
acts as sanctions, especially not to the delict.  A State can, without 
violating international law, attach sanctions to delicts committed 
within the territory of another State.67  
This quote represents an unequivocal endorsement of the jurisprudential 
legitimacy of extraterritoriality, at least in the context of delicts.  A similar 
sentiment, with more general application, is expressed when Kelsen states that 
“the legal order of the individual State may attach the coercive act as a 
consequence to conditioning facts which have occurred even outside its territory.”68  
Despite his belief “that all legal norms could or should be understood in terms of an 
 
64. Id. 
65. Edwin D. Dickinson, Introductory Comment to the Harvard Convention Research Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction with respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 443, 443 (1935). 
66. KELSEN, supra note 51, at 208. 
67. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
68. Id. at 308. 
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authorisation to an official to impose sanctions”69 and his conviction that “[i]t is the 
essence of a legal order that it tries to bring about lawful and to prevent unlawful 
behavior by coercive measures—that is, by the forcible deprivation of life, freedom, 
property, or other values as a reaction against a violation of the order,”70 this ought 
to put to rest any debate about whether Kelsen is for or against extraterritoriality 
as such. 
C. H. L. A. Hart 
Oxford professor Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart is famous for his “soft” 
positivism.  The fact that his influence is at least as imposing as his name is 
perhaps best illustrated by considering the attention that has been given to Hart’s 
“debates” with other legal philosophy giants such as Fuller and Dworkin.  In fact, 
it may be said that those debates have been the most dominant feature of legal 
philosophy over the past 50 years.   
In discussing the work of Hart, my focal point will be his best known 
publication, THE CONCEPT OF LAW,71 described by one of his primary sparring 
partners as “a contribution to the literature of jurisprudence such as we have not 
had in a long time.”72 
It is true that Hart makes several statements emphasizing that it is important 
for a legal system that its rules are obeyed, and as we already noted repeatedly, 
such a respect may indeed often be lacking in the context of extraterritorial claims.  
One of these statements of Hart’s is this: “[I]f a system of rules is to be imposed by 
force on any, there must be a sufficient number who accept it voluntarily.  Without 
their voluntary cooperation, thus creating authority, the coercive power of law and 
government cannot be established.”73 
Elsewhere in THE CONCEPT OF LAW, Hart also states that: 
[E]xcept in very small closely-knit societies, submission to the 
system of restraints would be folly if there were no organization for 
the coercion of those who would then try to obtain the advantages 
 
69. BIX, supra note 51, at 61. 
70. Hans Kelsen, Collective Security Under International Law, NAVAL WAR C. INT’L L. STUD. 1, 101 
(2001). Interestingly, Somek has argued, “At least in his later work, Kelsen was strongly inclined 
to reduce the ‘ought’ of the imposition of the sanction to the legal power of the organ to order the 
coercive act, or even the right to inflict it.” Alexander Somek, Kelsen Lives, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409, 
434 n.135 (2007). In support of this assertion, Somek points in particular to the following quote 
from HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1952): “[b]y the formula ‘ought to be 
applied’ nothing else is expressed but the idea that if the delict is committed the application of the 
sanction is legal.” Somek, supra note 70, 434 n.135. Thus, the central role Kelsen attributes to 
sanctions may be best seen as relating to enforceability, rather than actual enforcement. 
71. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3rd ed. 2012). 
72. FULLER, supra note 15, at 133. 
73. HART, supra note 71, at 196. 
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of the system without submitting to its obligations.  ‘Sanctions’ are 
therefore required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as 
guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be 
sacrificed to those who would not.  To obey, without this, would be 
to risk going to the wall.  Given this standing danger, what reason 
demands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive system.74 
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that Hart sees territorial limitations on the 
law as a standard feature: “In a modern state it is normally understood that, in the 
absence of special indications widening or narrowing the class, its general law 
extend to all persons within its territorial boundaries.”75  Importantly however, 
this quote also hints at an acceptance for extraterritoriality.  After all, Hart states 
here that the law normally applies to all persons within its territorial boundaries 
but can be widened.  Given that the starting point is an application to all persons 
within its territorial boundaries, any widening must involve persons beyond the 
territorial boundaries. 
In relation to the first two quotes above—those pointing to the importance for a 
legal system that its rules are obeyed and are backed by sanctions—we may ob-
serve that Hart, when speaking of the necessity of "a general habit of obedience,” 
emphasizes that this is essentially a vague and imprecise notion.  In fact he states 
that: “The question how many people must obey how many such general orders, 
and for how long, if there is to be law, no more admits of definite answers than the 
question how few hairs must a man have to be bald.”76 
And as to the importance of “sanctions,” we must recall that Hart is at pains to 
stress that international law—a system lacking organized sanctions—may well be 
referred to as law: “Yet once we free ourselves from the predictive analysis and its 
parent conception of law as essentially an order backed by threats, there seems no 
good reason for limiting the normative idea of obligation to rules supported by 
organized sanctions.”77 
Even clearer evidence of an acceptance of law that lacks effective sanctions is 
found elsewhere in his classic text.  For example, Hart states: “We need only re-
member that the statement that a group has a certain rule is compatible with the 
existence of a minority who not only break the rule but refuse to look upon it as a 
standard either for themselves or others.”78  
In light of the above, it seems difficult to argue that the theories Hart discusses 
in THE CONCEPT OF LAW present any barrier to the extraterritorial application of 
 
74. Id. at 198. 
75. Id. at 21. 
76. Id. at 24. 
77. Id. at 218. 
78. Id. at 56. 
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law.  However, let us nevertheless consider what is actually argued by those who 
suggest that the absence of enforceability makes an extraterritorial claim lack le-
gitimacy.  Is this claim not a distasteful expression of Darwinism in law?  A “sur-
vival of the fittest” through the “right of the strongest”?  After all, if we are arguing 
that the legitimacy of an extraterritorial claim stems from its enforceability, we are 
clearly endorsing the notion of “right” being on the side of the states that succeed 
in imposing their will on others.  Viewed in this light, rather than imposing rea-
sonable and well considered boundaries on extraterritorial claims, positivism 
framed as in the above may be seen to merely legitimize dominance based on brute 
strength. 
D. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner  
While one could identify a sizeable quantity of theories and theorists worthwhile 
of study in our setting, the line needs to be drawn somewhere.  Thus, I limit myself 
to including one more theory; that is, a state-centered rational choice theory of 
international law.  While this theory is focused on public international law, it is 
one of the most interesting recent additions to the arena, and its importance for 
the discussion in this article ought to be self-evident from the text below. 
A particularly interesting work in this field is THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW79 written by Harvard professor Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, 
professor at the University of Chicago.  Their interesting book, and the theory it 
presents, have been severely criticized to the degree of having been described as “a 
remarkable specimen of bad social theory!”80  Nevertheless, its relevance for the 
topic of this article cannot, and should not, be ignored. 
Goldsmith and Posner’s central theory is that “international law emerges from 
states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the 
interests of other states and the distribution of state power.”81  In more detail, 
Goldsmith and Posner identify four state-centered rational choice reasons why 
states comply with international law: (1) coincidence of interest, (2) coordination, 
(3) cooperation, and (4) coercion.82  As I discuss below, it is interesting to examine 
the role of international law in controlling extraterritoriality through the useful 
lens provided by Goldsmith and Posner’s four state-centered rational choice 
reasons why states comply with international law.  However, it is helpful to first 
consider aspects of the extensive criticism that has been directed at Goldsmith and 
Posner’s theory.  
 
79. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
80. Somek, supra note 70, at 449. 
81. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 79, at 3. 
82. Id. at 13. 
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The criticism is too substantial to be reproduced here, and the reader may refer 
to the works of Somek83 and that of Hathaway and Lavinbuk84 for a fuller account 
of the theory’s weaknesses.  Here, we need only concern ourselves with two 
issues—the two issues I see as most fundamental for our context.  First, Goldsmith 
and Posner seem to underestimate the significant relevance of reputation, a topic I 
will have reason to return to below.  In more detail, Goldsmith and Posner decided 
to consistently exclude a preference for complying with international law from the 
state’s interest calculation.85  I am not seeking to argue that all states put greater 
importance on such compliance than they do on all other matters.  But to point to 
the obvious error in Goldsmith and Posner’s decision, one need only admit that a 
preference for complying with international law is one of several competing 
interests that states take into account in their rational choice.  This claim is not 
even denied by Goldsmith and Posner themselves.86     
Second, while the theory advanced by Goldsmith and Posner amounts to a 
valuable contribution in that it brings attention to the way in which states 
typically act, it effectively kills off international law, at least as far as customary 
international law goes.  I am not the first to point this out.  For example, 
commenting on earlier works by Goldsmith and Posner, Guzman has noted that 
they deny the existence of customary international law.87  However, Goldsmith and 
Posner persistently deny this accusation, stating that their claim is “not that 
customary international law does not exist, but rather that it is not an exogenous 
influence on state behaviour.”88 
In the end, Goldsmith and Posner’s denial is unsustainable.  It would be an odd 
notion of law that accepts law as not being an exogenous influence.  Goldsmith and 
Posner’s claim of customary international law as a non-binding endogenous 
influence may at best be characterized as second degree murder—it is a non-
premeditated killing, resulting from an assault in which the death of customary 
international law was a distinct possibility. 
In any case, ultimately the most interesting aspect of Goldsmith and Posner’s 
theory for our purposes is this: if state-centered self-interest is all that matters, 
then any lacking enforceability of an extraterritorial claim cannot be a concern, 
since the state making the claim must be presumed to have anticipated the lacking 
 
83. Somek, supra note 70, at 409. 
84. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1404 (2006) (reviewing The Limits of International Law, supra note 79). 
85. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 79, at 9. 
86. Id. 
87. Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1875 
(2002). 
88. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 79, at 42-43. 
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enforceability.  In other words, taking this perspective, international law imposes 
no limitations whatsoever on claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
Such a conclusion may be seen to render further discussion of the theory 
advanced by Goldsmith and Posner redundant.  However, it is interesting indeed 
to examine in some more detail how Goldsmith and Posner approach customary 
international law in particular—the area of international law most commonly seen 
to regulate jurisdictional claims in public international law.  
It is standard practice for writers in the field to take the Harvard Research 
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (the Harvard Draft) as 
their point of departure when addressing how international law regulates 
jurisdiction.  The Harvard Draft was focused on penal jurisdiction,89 and despite, 
or perhaps due to, it having been written 80 years ago, there is little dispute as to 
the remarkable position it holds as a guide on the topic of jurisdiction in public 
international law. 
Essentially, the Harvard Draft identifies a set of grounds for jurisdiction to 
varying degrees recognized under international law: 
An analysis of modern national codes of penal law and penal 
procedure, checked against the conclusions of reliable writers and 
the resolutions of international conferences or learned societies, 
and supplemented by some exploration of the jurisprudence of 
national courts, discloses five general principles on which a more 
or less extensive penal jurisdiction is claimed by States at the 
present time.  These five general principles are: first, the 
territorial principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the 
place where the offence is committed; second, the nationality 
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality 
or national character of the person committing the offence; third, 
the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to 
the national interest injured by the offence; fourth, the 
universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the 
custody of the person committing the offence; and fifth, the passive 
personality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the 
nationality or national character of the person injured by the 
offence.  Of these five principles, the first is everywhere regarded 
as of primary importance and of fundamental character.  The 
second is universally accepted, though there are striking 
differences in the extent to which it is used in the different 
national systems.  The third is claimed by most States, regarded 
with misgivings in a few, and generally ranked as the basis of an 
auxiliary competence.  The fourth is widely though by no means 
universally accepted as the basis of an auxiliary competence, 
except for the offence of piracy, with respect to which it is the 
 
89. Dickinson, supra note 65, at 446. 
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generally recognized principle of jurisdiction.  The fifth, asserted in 
some forms by a considerable number of States and contested by 
others, is admittedly auxiliary in character and is probably not 
essential for any State if the ends served are adequately provided 
for on other principles.90 
While the framework provided under the Harvard Draft represents the 
standard position amongst public international law scholars, it is a far cry from a 
solid comprehensive framework for determining the circumstances under which a 
state may claim jurisdiction under public international law.  In many ways, it is 
nothing but a surrogate for a properly considered framework—a proxy making the 
task of textbook writers easier than it would have been in the absence of the 
general agreement gathered around the Harvard Draft. 
Goldsmith and Posner do not specifically address the Harvard Draft in their 
book.  However, it is interesting to consider extraterritoriality from the perspective 
of the four state-centered rational choice reasons why states comply with 
international law they identify.  In doing so, at least two different perspectives 
could be adopted.  One could consider how extraterritorial claims as such may be 
motivated by Goldsmith and Posner’s four state-centered rational choice reasons 
why states comply with international law.  For example, one could observe how the 
so-called universality principle fits rather well within Goldsmith and Posner’s 
reference to coordination or, indeed, cooperation.  
Alternatively, one may chose to consider how Goldsmith and Posner’s four state-
centered rational choice reasons why states comply with international law work in 
the context of other states seeking to impose limitations on the extraterritorial 
reach of a particular state’s law.  Why would such a state appear to yield to the 
pressure from other states?  It is obvious that other states may coerce a state not to 
pursue extraterritorial claims.  But in the end, it seems to me that the reality is 
that in most cases, the reason for lacking attempts of enforcing extraterritorial 
claims is—if we adopt Goldsmith and Posner’s terminology—found in a coincidence 
of interest.  This may seem surprising at a first glance, but I think that it often is 
the case that the state that could make an extraterritorial claim does not want to 
do so for reasons of cost and complications.  It is thus in that state’s interest not to 
pursue the extraterritorial claim it may claim to be entitled to pursue.  As it is not 
in the interest of the other state to assist in the first state’s extraterritorial claim, 
there is quite simply a coincidence of interest.  
In the end, perhaps the most correct reading of the relationship between 
Goldsmith and Posner’s four state-centered rational choice reasons why states 
comply with international law and the Harvard Draft’s set of grounds for 
 
90. Id. at 445. 
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jurisdiction to varying degrees recognized under international law is that an 
acceptance of the former renders the latter irrelevant. 
IV.  Analysis and Response 
The study above lends itself to several conclusions, some of which are to be 
expected and others not so expected.  For example, even as small a sample of 
theories, as the one presented here, brings attention to a considerable diversity of 
views ranging from Kelsen’s view of monism with international law supremacy to 
Goldsmith and Posner’s theory that does not see any limits being placed on 
extraterritoriality apart from state self-interests.  This was no doubt to be 
expected.  Yet despite this diversity of theoretical underpinnings, foundations, and 
ideals, the express or implied acceptance of extraterritoriality without necessarily 
effective enforcement was virtually universal.  This was, perhaps, unexpected. 
The above suggests that such claims may be supported regardless of which of 
the major schools of legal theory one bonds with.  However, this is not to deny that 
extraterritoriality without necessarily effective enforcement may be more palatable 
under certain philosophical strands than others.  For example, an acceptance of 
such extraterritoriality comes naturally under the concept of law I have presented 
elsewhere, where law L is n(Lr + Lr(Context)), where Lr represents legal rules 
created by legislative enactments and court judgments, and Lr(Context) represents 
those considerations, internal to the legal rule, that affect the application of the 
legal rule, i.e., the legal rule’s context.91  As the context of a legal rule so defined 
may be broad indeed, this theory of law may easily embrace extraterritorial claims 
made without any real prospect of enforcement. 
Another conclusion we can draw is that the work of some theorists is 
multifaceted to the degree that it may be read both to support and to oppose the 
idea of extraterritoriality with enforcement difficulties.  For example, the works of 
Kelsen and Hart have been relied upon by some leading scholars to suggest that 
laws that lack the means of being enforced can be seen to undermine the legal 
system.92  This is not necessarily an invalid conclusion.  But given the aspects of 
Kelsen and Hart’s works identified above, it may be a proposition that needs to be 
somewhat pruned; after all, as was illustrated above, both Kelsen and Hart 
recognize a role for extraterritoriality, including extraterritoriality with 
enforcement difficulties.  
At least one of the conclusions that must be conceded from the study above 
 
91. See Svantesson, What is “Law,” supra note 18, at 457. 
92. Christopher Kuner, The ‘Internal Morality’ of European Data Protection Law 6 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443797. 
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leaves a somewhat bitter taste.  Despite my serious commitment to carefully 
analyzing the work of the examined commentators, there remain several 
perspectives I felt I needed to leave un-, or at least under-explored.  For example, I 
could well have devoted (more or clearer) attention to how the interaction between 
“competence”93 and “validity” affects the legitimacy of extraterritorial claims.  
On that matter, drawing upon the writings of Hohfeld, Kelsen, Ross, and Hart, 
Scandinavian legal philosopher Torben Spaak concludes that “[a]t least Kelsen, 
Hart and Ross seem to think that competence is a necessary condition for validity, 
but the same can probably be said of Hohfeld, too.”94  Consequently, Spaak 
identifies a relatively widespread agreement on the significance of competence for 
validity. 
Spaak puts forward the following definition of competence, where p refers to a 
“person,” LP stands for “legal position,” a is “action,” and S means “situation:” p 
has the competence to change LP if, and only if, there is an a and an S such that if 
p in S performs a, and thus goes about it in the right way, p will, through a, change 
LP. 
Importantly, this formulation suggests that it is the change of legal position (LP) 
that is important for validity, not the effective enforcement of the new LP.  Thus, 
under this definition of competence, the competence to perform a legal act, and 
indirectly the validity of that act (such as the creation of a legislative provision or 
the rendering of a judgment) does not depend on actual effective enforcement of the 
legal position created by that act.95  This is no doubt an important observation for 
our purposes, and an observation that further supports extraterritorial claims.  
In the end, it seems that jurisprudence provides an overwhelmingly rich 
environment for discussions of the legitimacy of extraterritorial claims, and any 
researcher wishing to avoid exhausting her readers entirely will be forced to 
surrender before exploring every possible angle—unfortunately it is necessary to 
leave some, probably most, stones unturned.    
 
93. Here, we are dealing with “competence,” as in “authorization.” In this sense, competence is a 
normative concept meaning that “a person has competence by virtue of a norm and that the 
exercise of competence changes a person’s normative position.” Torben Spaak, Explicating the 
Concept of Legal Competence, in CONCEPTS IN LAW 67, 67 (Jaap Hage et al. eds., 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014402. As Spaak points out by reference to a statement by Lindahl, 
we are here dealing with competence in the sense of what in the Common Law tradition often is 
referred to as “power:” “British and American writers prefer the term ‘power,’ while Scandinavian, 
Continental-European and Latin American writers speak rather of ‘competence.’” Id. at 67 n.1 
(quoting LARS LINDAHL, POSITION AND CHANGE 194 (1977)). 
94. Spaak, supra note 93, at 71. 
95. However, it is important to keep in mind that Spaak also shows that “having competence does not 
entail having a right.” Id. at 78. Spaak proves his point by reference to how, e.g., “a thief has the 
competence to sell stolen goods to a bona fide purchaser even though he is not permitted to do so.” 
Id. 
 A Jurisprudential Justification for Extraterritoriality in (Private) International Law 
551 
Below, I will confine myself to exploring a limited set of key observations that 
may be made based upon the above. 
A. “The dual, or triple, role of law” 
As has been pointed to repeatedly, much, indeed too much, has been made of the 
impact enforcement difficulties have on extraterritorial claims.  For example, 
leading commentators like Goldsmith have stated that: 
Most Internet content providers will not be subject to any 
regulation other than the one in the territory in which they have 
presence . . .  [T]hese Internet users might indirectly suffer 
consequences from another nation’s territorial regulation of the 
user’s Internet transmission.  But these offshore users with no 
local assets are generally beyond the regulating nation’s 
enforcement jurisdiction.  The Internet users that need to worry 
about the liability consequences of multiple, conflicting regulatory 
requirements are persons and firms with a multi-jurisdictional 
presence.96 
Goldsmith uses this reasoning to conclude that threats of simultaneous multiple 
national regulation of Internet transactions are significantly exaggerated.  I do not 
fully share Goldsmith’s assessment.97  
The real litmus test for the value of extraterritorial claims is not to be found in 
whether such claims can be backed up by enforcement.  It is not entirely correct, as 
Goldsmith states, that “[t]he true scope and power of a nation’s regulation is 
measured by its enforcement jurisdiction, not its prescriptive jurisdiction.”98  
Here, we may recall what I see as one of Hart’s most important contributions: 
The principal functions of the law as a means of social control are 
not to be seen in private litigation or prosecutions, which represent 
vital but still ancillary provisions for the failures of the system.  It 
is to be seen in the diverse ways in which the law is used to 
control, to guide, and to plan life out of court.99 
This observation may seem mundane indeed, and Hart may not necessarily be 
the only or first commentator to bring attention to what we can call “the dual role 
of law,” but it is one of the most important observations made in Hart’s THE 
 
96. Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of the Internet, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 135, 139-40 (2000). 
97. However, I hasten to add that to properly evaluate what he is stating we must take note of two 
things. First, Goldsmith is conscious of the effect of what I below term “market destroying 
measures,” and second, he takes a traditional narrow view on what is extraterritorial and what is 
territorial with spill-over. 
98. Goldsmith, supra note 96, at 139. 
99. HART, supra note 71, at 40. 
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CONCEPT OF LAW, and something we must always keep in mind.100  
In light of the dual role of law, enforcement is not quite an as essential feature of 
law as one may first think on a superficial consideration of the matter.  After all, 
the law’s role as a tool to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court does not 
necessarily depend on enforcement.  
Putting this in the context of extraterritoriality, then the real litmus test is the 
extent to which a State’s extraterritorial claim can affect the conduct of foreign 
parties—whether the consequences of a breach of state A’s laws is seen, by the 
targeted foreign actors, as having consequences of such a nature so as to make 
those actors prefer abiding by state A’s law, rather than having to face those 
consequences.  In this context, the potential enforcement is only one factor of at 
least three, the other two being the potential for reputational damage in case of 
breach and the potential impact of so-called “market destroying measures” at the 
disposal of state A.  I will discuss these two matters below. 
However, first I wish to suggest that perhaps we can identify a third role that 
the law serves.  We can say that quite apart from being a tool to decide legal 
disputes and to provide a framework to control, to guide, and to plan life out of 
court, law is a tool to express and communicate the values of the society that 
created the law.  This is important not least in the context of the discussion of what 
I below refer to as “bark jurisdiction.” 
B. The “Reputational Dimension” of Extraterritoriality   
The potential for reputational damages is rather self-explanatory and has been 
neatly described by Kohl in the following terms: “The fact is that being perceived 
as a law-breaker is not good for business.”101  To this I would, however, add the 
reservation that the damage done by being perceived as a law-breaker, at least in 
part, depends on whether the law being broken is seen as morally justifiable or not 
(a topic I will have reason to elaborate upon below).  For example, the international 
reputation of a company that has been breaching the racial discrimination rules of 
Nazi Germany and of apartheid South Africa may indeed be boosted by the law-
breaking activity. 
 
100. Similar notions may also be found in more recent commentaries. For example, MacCormick notes: 
“Normative power is, then, the ability to take decisions that change what a person ought to or 
ought not to do, or may or may not do, or what a person is able or unable to do, in the framework 
of some normative order.” NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 
154 (2007). The reference to normative power as the ability to make decisions that change what a 
person ought to or ought not to do clearly relates to law as a tool to guide and to plan life out of 
court. In contrast, the reference to normative power as the ability to make decisions that change 
what a person is able or unable to do is more in line with law’s other role. 
101. KOHL, supra note 1, at 208. 
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To address the topic of the reputational dimension of extraterritorial claims at 
the depth it deserves, we need also consider just how concerned business is about 
being seen violating laws.  With his extensive experience from legal practice, 
Kuner is uniquely well-equipped to comment within his field of expertise; that is, 
data privacy law.  Discussing the European Union’s Data Protection Directive,102 
he noted that: “Besides ‘legal’ enforcement methods such as fines, injunctions, 
criminal penalties etc., ‘soft’ penalties such as adverse publicity are an important 
incentive to comply with data protection law, since damage to a company’s 
reputation can ultimately cause it more harm in the marketplace than can a 
fine.”103 
Turning to public international law, it is worth noting how, in discussing the 
criticism raised against Kelsen’s perception of public international law, Somek 
stated that: “It could be argued that even if all states disrespected their 
international obligations these obligations would be effective enough for the 
international legal system to exist as long as universal non-compliance is 
universally perceived as legally wrong. The whole system would be, at best, a 
system of universal hypocrisy.”104 This statement is no less relevant for our context 
here.  In the end, the true value, and indeed legitimacy, of extraterritorial claims 
may not rest on the enforcement or enforceability of the claim.  Instead, in our 
system of “universal hypocrisy” such claims have both value and jurisprudential 
legitimacy as long as non-compliance is perceived as legally wrongful.  And I would 
argue that such a perception need not necessarily be universal in nature, as long 
as it is sufficiently widespread.   
Given the above, we need not dwell on this matter further for it seems beyond 
intelligent dispute that the reputational dimension of extraterritorial claims is a 
relevant factor to be considered independently of the efficacy of the enforcement of 
that claim.105 
 
102. Directive 1995/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 95/46/EEC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=en. 
103. Kuner, The ‘Internal Morality’ of European Data Protection Law, supra note 92, at 9. 
104. Somek, supra note 70, at 430 (internal footnote omitted). 
105. I say this, acknowledging that there is a vast literature on the relationship, or lack thereof, 
between legal sanctions and reputational consequences. See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci, On the 
Interaction between Legal and Reputational Sanctions (2014), available at 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/ documents/iacobucci/iacobucci%20fines 
%20reputation%20jls%202014%20formatted.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
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C. “Domestic Enforceability of Extraterritorial Claims” through 
“Market Destroying Measures”106 
As has been noted already, it is commonly stressed that the real impacts of 
extraterritorial jurisdictional claims is severely limited by the intrinsic difficulty of 
enforcing such claims.  For example, Goldsmith and Wu note that “[w]ith few 
exceptions governments can use their coercive powers only within their borders 
and control offshore Internet communications only by controlling local 
intermediaries, local assets, and local persons.”107 
However, perhaps we can see the true state of things more clearly if we remove 
the word “only” from the quoted statement made by Goldsmith and Wu, so as to 
end up with the following sentence instead: With few exceptions governments can 
use their coercive powers within their borders and control offshore Internet 
communications by controlling local intermediaries, local assets, and local persons.  
This, in my view, improvement alters the statement from what can somewhat 
harshly be called a meaningless cliché, to a highly useful description of principles 
well-established at least 400 years ago.108   
The word “only” misleadingly gives the impression that such powers are of 
limited or no significance for the overall question of extraterritoriality.  After all, 
the power governments have within their territorial borders can be put to great 
effect against offshore Internet communications.  A government determined to 
have an impact on foreign Internet actors that are beyond its directly effective 
jurisdictional reach may introduce what we can call “market destroying measures” 
to penalize the foreign party.  For example, it may introduce substantive law 
allowing its courts to, due to the foreign party’s actions and subsequent refusal to 
appear before the court, make a finding that: 
(a) that party is not allowed to trade within the jurisdiction in question; 
(b) debts owed to that party are unenforceable within the jurisdiction in 
question; and/or 
(c) parties within the control of that government (e.g., residents or citizens) 
are not allowed to trade with the foreign party. 
Parallels to such market destroying measures can be found in international 
relations.  As seen most recently in Ukraine, the world’s response to the Russian 
 
106. This part draws and expands upon the discussion of market destroying measures presented in 
Dan Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of E.U. Data Privacy Law: Its Theoretical Justification 
and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, 50 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 53-102 (2014). See also 
SVANTESSON, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DATA PRIVACY LAW, supra note 2. 
107. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD 159 (2008) (emphasis added). 
108. See generally, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012). 
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invasion has so far been (mainly) in the form of sanctions we are used to in 
international relations.  Thus, it is interesting to consider the role of sanctions in 
international relations.  Sanctions in that setting are defined to mean: 
The use or threat of use of economic capacity by one international 
actor, or group of such actors against another international actor 
or group of actors, with the intention of (a) punishing the latter for 
its breach of a certain rule or (b) preventing it from infringing a 
rule which the party applying sanctions deem important.109 
Perhaps put even more potently, sanctions are “a tool for coercing a target to 
change a course of action or forgo some future course of action by altering the cost-
benefit calculus of a decision-maker to favor the preferred policy of the sender.”110  
Thus, sanctions under international relations are very similar in nature and 
aim to the market destroying measures I am discussing here, and in exploring 
such measures further we have a wealth of materials to draw from in the literature 
on sanctions.  In fact, as noted by Brockman-Hawe: “If there were a Top 10 List of 
topics most scrutinized by the international academic community, the issues of 
apposite objectives and justifications, not to mention the effectiveness, impact and 
suitable method of analysis of sanctions would probably turn up and occupy 
several spaces.”111 
In light of options of the mentioned type of market destroying measures, the 
enforceability of extraterritorial jurisdictional claims may not be as limited as it 
may seem at a first glance.  Perhaps, we can usefully distinguish between the 
“extraterritorial enforceability of the extraterritorial claim” and the “domestic 
enforceability of the extraterritorial claim.”  It is only the former that is suffering 
in efficacy, not the latter.  The latter does not necessarily lack efficacy since states 
may take market destroying measures to penalize foreign parties within their own 
jurisdictions.  This is a key point, indeed, because it defeats the argument that 
extraterritorial claims lack means for enforcement—at least from a jurisprudential 
perspective, and possibly in practice too, we have here found some “protective 
footwear” that addresses and overcomes the Achilles’ heel of extraterritoriality! 
 
109. Sofie Heine-Ellison, The Impact and Effectiveness of Multilateral Economic Sanctions; A 
Comparative Study, 5 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 81, 83 (2001). 
110. Jason C. Nelson, The United Nations and the Employment of Sanctions as a Tool of International 
Statecraft, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 105, 110 (2005). 
111. Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, Using Internet "Borders" to Coerce or Punish: The DPRK as an 
Example of the Potential Utility of Internet Sanctions, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 182 (2007). 
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D. “Bite jurisdiction” vs. “Bark jurisdiction”112 
The above has highlighted that in addition to being pursued due to the often 
vain hope of effective overseas enforcement, extraterritorial claims may be pursued 
due to the reputational impact such claims may have and/or due to the possibility 
of using market destroying measures to enforce the extraterritorial claim 
domestically.  It has also been suggested that law, including extraterritorial 
claims, may be a tool to express and communicate the values of the society that 
created the law and made the extraterritorial claim.  
To reemphasize the importance of this, it means that there is more to the idea of 
extraterritoriality than the critics who focus on lacking enforcement seem to 
realize.  Indeed, the fact that a lacking enforcement mechanisms is somewhat of a 
hallmark of international law is acknowledged also by proponents of international 
law.  As noted by Guzman, “Whatever the strengths of international law, it 
remains almost entirely without coercive enforcement – the primary tool used to 
generate compliance in domestic systems.”113  This characteristic lack of effective 
enforcement mechanisms thus sets this legal arena apart so as to render 
inapplicable some truths generally applicable to the legal system as such.     
Elsewhere I have introduced the distinction between what I call “bite 
jurisdiction” on the one hand and “bark jurisdiction” on the other.  Not all 
jurisdictional claims are equally likely to be carried out in practice.  Indeed, some 
jurisdictional claims are made despite the realization that they have virtually no 
prospect of being exercised in practice—they are merely attempts to bark; to make 
clear, to articulate, a particular legal position.  Placed in Hart’s terminology, they 
fall in the category of law used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court.  Or, 
as I have argued, they may be made to express and communicate the values of the 
society that made the claims.  In contrast, jurisdictional claims properly described 
as “bite jurisdiction” are aimed at actually being effectively enforced.  Obviously, it 
may not always be easy to draw sharp lines between failed attempts at bite 
jurisdiction on the one hand, and genuine instances of bark jurisdiction on the 
other hand. 
The difficulty of distinguishing between failed attempts at bite jurisdiction and 
genuine bark jurisdiction brings us to the first matter that must be discussed at 
some depth: Do, and should, states make clear whether the extraterritorial claims 
they make are bite or bark? 
 
112. I first introduced this distinction in Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of E.U. Data Privacy Law, 
supra note 106, at 58-60 and SVANTESSON, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DATA PRIVACY LAW, supra 
note 2, at 68-72. 
113. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY ix (2008). 
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My suspicion is that currently there is little, indeed too little, consideration 
amongst those making extraterritorial claims as to whether they are making a bite 
or bark claim.  However, exceptions can be found.  For example, in discussing the 
extraterritorial dimension of the then proposed Singaporean Personal Data 
Protection Bill (PDPB), the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts 
(MICA) observed: 
MICA is cognisant of the implementation challenges.  In 
particular, where the organisation in question has no presence in 
Singapore, it would be difficult to carry out investigations into any 
complaint made in relation to an activity of the organisation, or to 
proceed with any enforcement action against the organisation.  
However, such coverage would act as deterrence for overseas 
companies to engage in activities that might result in a breach of 
the PDPA, and provide consistent treatment for local vis-a-vis 
overseas organisations with data-related operations in 
Singapore.114 
It would thus seem that there is an expectation that the grab for 
extraterritoriality, in part, is a conscious claim for “bark jurisdiction” rather than a 
real attempt at “bite jurisdiction.”  Furthermore, while Australian consumer law 
has some extraterritorial reach, the body tasked with enforcing it—the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)—seems to view this largely as an 
instance of a mere bark claim: “All your usual consumer rights apply when you 
shop with an Australian online business.  Those rights may also apply when you 
buy from an overseas online business although you might find it difficult to get a 
repair, replacement or refund because the business is not based in Australia.”115 
Thus, it is clear that in some instances bark claims are more or less clearly 
identified as such, and perhaps their bark nature is quite widely accepted by the 
public.  Nevertheless, any decision as to whether to announce an extraterritorial 
claim as bark jurisdiction must be guided by a balancing of the advantage of 
transparency and the risk that such an announcement will cause the claim to be 
ignored. 
In any case, and it is here it gets interesting, one prominent scholar, Bygrave, 
has described bark jurisdiction using the term “regulatory overreaching:” “By 
‘regulatory overreaching’ is meant a situation in which rules are expressed so 
generally and non-discriminately that they apply prima facie to a large range of 
 
114. MINISTRY OF INFO., COMM., AND THE ARTS, PROPOSED PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION BILL, PUB. 
CONSULTATION (19 Mar. 2012) (Sing.). 
115. Shopping online, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION, 
http://accc.gov.au/consumers/online-shopping/shopping-online (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).  
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activities without having much of a realistic chance of being enforced.”116  Like 
several other leading commentators such as Kuner,117 Maier,118 Reed,119 and 
Moerel,120 Bygrave sees “regulatory overreaching” as a problem121—indeed, the 
acceptance of this negative view of bark jurisdiction seems nearly universal, 
although perhaps one can see hints at a softening in Bygrave’s approach in his 
most recent writings.122  
The widespread skepticism of bark jurisdiction may not necessarily come as a 
surprise in light of how law is viewed in practice.  Drawing upon his practical 
experience in the field of data privacy law, Kuner points out:  
The lack of widespread and consistent enforcement of data 
protection violations has a negative affect [sic] on the willingness 
of data controllers to comply with European data protection rules. . 
. . In the globalized economy, all factors affecting cost (including 
 
116. Lee A. Bygrave, Determining Applicable Law Pursuant to European Data Protection Legislation, 
16 COMPU. L. & SEC. REP. 252, 255 (2000). 
117. Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2), 
18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 227, 235 (2010). 
118. Bernhard Maier, How Has the Law Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the Internet? 18 
INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 142, 161 (2010). 
119. REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 49 (“The enforcement of a law also plays 
an important role in engendering respect for that law. If a state consistently fails to enforce a law 
it send a message to the law’s subjects that the state does not expect them to obey it. . . . Where a 
state wishes to enforce a law but is unable to do so in any consistent and effective way, the 
message is rather different but equally damaging to respect. Here the state desires that its 
commands should be obeyed, but is impotent to force individuals to do so. This weakens respect 
not merely for the particular law but for all that state’s laws.”). Further, in another publication, 
Reed stresses: “A regulator which is otherwise accepted as having legitimate authority can easily 
lose that authority if it has no effective way of enforcing its rules.” Reed, Cloud Governance: The 
Way Forward, supra note 50, at 374. Elsewhere in his interesting book, Reed seeks to incorporate 
enforceability into a “rule of recognition” for cyberspace, like the rule of recognition famously 
discussed by Hart:  
Adopting Raz’s approach would suggest that what we might term the subject rule of recog-
nition has two limbs: foreign laws have authority for a cyberspace actor if the risk…of their 
enforcement (or other adverse consequences) is sufficiently great that a prudent actor 
would follow them; and they also have authority if the actor has sufficient respect for that 
foreign legal system to create a moral obligation to comply with its laws, or at least some of 
them.  
 REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 86. Combining these quotes, it seems 
that while Reed has clear concerns about bark jurisdiction causing a loss of respect for the law, he 
nevertheless admits that bark jurisdiction may well meet the criteria of his rule of recognition. 
120. Lokke Moerel, The Long Arm of E.U. Data Protection Law, 1 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 23, 24 (2011). 
121. Bygrave, Determining Applicable Law, supra note 116, at 255. 
122. Lee A. Bygrave, Data privacy law and the Internet: policy challenges, in EMERGING CHALLENGES 
IN PRIVACY LAW 259, 277 (Normann Witzleb et al. eds., 2014) (“[S]ceptical of giving law an 
extraterritorial dimension that remains dormant . . . [but] [i]t could be argued, however, that 
giving law an extraterritorial reach that is not followed up by practical enforcement is still 
valuable as a demarcation of jurisdictional lines.” (relating to the bite/bark distinction I outlined 
in SVANTESSON, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DATA PRIVACY LAW, supra note 2)).  
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legal compliance burdens) tend to be subject to a risk management 
exercise, with compliance being more likely when the risks and 
costs of non-compliance are higher than those of compliance.  
Thus, in many cases data controllers may regard data protection 
rules as a kind of bureaucratic nuisance rather than as “law” in 
the same category as tax and other laws, mainly because of the 
relative lack of enforcement and the relative mildness of the 
possible penalties.123 
This observation is important and undermines the strength and significance of 
what I here refer to as “bark jurisdiction.”  However, while we must concede the 
correctness of Kuner’s assertion, it does not force us to abandon faith in 
extraterritorial bark jurisdiction as such.  Kuner makes his statement in relation 
to one particular field, that is, EU data privacy law.  He does not assert any wider 
scope for it than that.  Thus, it need not have application for other areas such as, 
for example, transgressions of environmental law.  Furthermore, in the same 
publication, Kuner also emphasizes that “there seems to be little relation between 
the legal force of the particular types of data protection rules and their practical 
importance.”124  Certain sources, he notes, like the opinions of the Article 29 
Working Party carry great weight even though they lack binding force.125  This 
could, of course, only be possible where the value of the rules articulated does not 
depend on their practical enforceability.  Thus, maybe it could be said that bark 
jurisdictions—on a certain interpretation of its meaning—has its parallels in other, 
substantive, areas of law.  
While we are drawing comparisons to other, substantive, areas of law, it is also 
worth noting the extensive scholarship that suggests that the level of risk of 
enforcement has only a limited influence over criminal behavior.126  For example, 
Tyler and Darley have observed that “[a]lthough research supports the basic 
premise of the deterrence model, it also suggests that estimates of the likelihood of 
being caught and punished have, at best, a minor influence on people’s law-related 
behavior.”127  
Be that as it may, we can further prune the scope of applicability of Kuner’s 
statement by bearing in mind that he speaks only of the EU situation.  In other 
cultures the reputational dimension of data privacy law is marked more strongly.  
For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that the comparative lack of 
 
123. Kuner, The ‘Internal Morality’ of European Data Protection Law, supra note 92, at 9. 
124. Id. at 4. 
125. Id. 
126. I am indebted to Professor Chris Reed for bringing these materials to my attention. 
127. Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About 
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities Into Account When Formulating Substantive 
Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 713 (2000). 
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enforcement possibilities in Japanese data privacy law is meant to be compensated 
for by a stronger sense of reputation loss in case of data privacy violations.  And 
indeed as discussed above, Kuner himself stresses the important role the 
reputational dimension plays in whether laws will be respected in practice or not, 
and bark jurisdiction may well be justified by reference to the reputational impact 
of failing to meet the expectations of the extraterritorial claim.    
At any rate, an analysis of the impact of Kuner’s observation has helped tease 
out two important factors—area of law and cultural setting—affecting the 
relevance of bark jurisdiction.  As I discuss in more detail below, we can link these 
two factors together as parts of the moral framework that dictates the effectiveness 
of extraterritorial claims lacking enforcement. 
More generally, I do not see it as accurate to view “bark jurisdiction” or 
“regulatory overreaching” as a problem per se.  After all, there may well be solid 
reasons why a State may wish to make clear its standpoint on a particular issue by 
legislating against it even though the effective enforcement of the law in question 
may be difficult, cumbersome, or indeed, unlikely.  This is as true in the 
international extraterritorial context as it is in the context of domestic law with a 
clear territorial limitation (e.g., legislation making it a criminal offense to drive 
through a red light).  Staying in the data privacy law environment, it is worth 
pausing to consider how the highly influential EU Article 29 Working Group has 
noted that: “There exist examples that the foreign web site may nevertheless follow 
the judgement and adapt its data processing with a view to developing good 
business practice and to maintaining a good commercial image [even where a third 
countries will not recognize and enforce the judgement].128 
We can here reconnect to the reputational dimension brought into focus above.  
Support for this proposition can also be drawn from Hart’s statement: “In fact I 
think it quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law as such serves 
beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of such 
conduct.”129  Hart, in the italicized text, is expressly referring to the law’s role as 
“bark” jurisdiction; bark jurisdiction is all about providing standards of criticism of 
particular kinds of conduct.130    
 
128. Stefano Rodota, Article 29 Working Group, Working Document on Determining the International 
Application of EU Data Protection Law to Personal Data Processing on the Internet by Non-E.U. 
Based Web Sites 15 (The Working Party, Working Paper No. 56, 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp56_en.pdf. 
129. HART, supra note 71, at 249 (emphasis added). 
130. This point is in no way undermined by the fact that Hart follows the quoted statement with the 
observation: 
This will not of course serve to distinguish laws from other rules or principles with the 
same general aims; the distinctive feature of law are the provision it makes by secondary 
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Thus, I see the point Kohl makes when she claims that “large-scale non-
compliance with any legal rule is problematic not just in terms of the failure of 
achieving the law’s purpose, but also in terms of undermining the law’s and 
regulator’s credibility more generally”131 and Kuner’s similar claim that laws that 
lack the means of being enforced can be seen to undermine the legal system.132  
And I can sympathize to a degree with Bygrave assertion that “posturing without 
punch or even potential punch tends to be counterproductive,”133 and statements 
such as “[w]hen criminal laws have nothing but symbolic value . . . they are likely 
to erode rather than build confidence in the justice system, since they quickly come 
to be seen as paper tigers.”134  However, I am not convinced these claims go deep 
enough to do justice to the complexity of the issue at hand.  On my reading, they 
seem to (a) neglect or underestimate135 the dual (or triple) role of law, (b) 
undervalue the reputational dimension of extraterritoriality, and (c) overlook what 
I above referred to as domestic enforceability of extraterritorial claims through 
market destroying measures.  And indeed, in discussing Fuller above, using the 
example of how ineffective regulation of domestic violence also has legitimacy and 
utility, I have brought attention to what must be a fundamental flaw of statements 
such as those noted above. 
Adding to what I have already remarked on this issue, I suggest that the risk 
that laws that lack the means of being enforced will undermine the legal system is 
small where the parts of the law that are difficult to enforce are not dominant or 
even close to being the dominant feature of the legal system in question.  One need 
only consider those situations where people in abusive dictatorships cling onto the 
notion of human rights even though those rights are unlikely to be upheld; morally 
justifiable law136—including morally justifiable law that cannot be enforced—has a 
quality that cannot, and should not, be ignored.  And maybe this is exactly where 
we reach the core of this issue—moral justification.  
In her excellent book on jurisdiction and the Internet, Kohl states: “It is 
 
rules for the identification, change, and enforcement of its standards and the general claim 
it makes to priority over other standards.  
 Id. at 249. 
131. KOHL, supra note 1, at 153. 
132. Kuner, Data Protection Law, supra note 117, at 235-36. 
133. Bygrave, Data privacy law and the Internet, supra note 122, at 277. 
134. Coughlan et al., supra note 12, at 50. 
135. Bygrave acknowledges the dual role of the law by observing that: “Demarcation of values and 
ideals is an integral element of all law.” Bygrave, Data privacy law and the Internet, supra note 
22, at 277. However, he then returns to his starting point of a need for the law to “pack a punch.” 
Id. 
136. Defining this term would take us into an interesting and fascinating area of debate that 
unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this article. 
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enforceability that really matters, not actual enforcement.”137  She then proceeds to 
note that at least in the transnational context the reason for the importance of 
enforceability “lies often not simply, or even mainly, in inducing a fear of a sanction 
in the case of non-compliance, but rather in affirming the foreign law’s 
legitimacy.”138  Thus, perhaps it can be said that the relevance and value of bark 
jurisdiction depends on whether the jurisdictional claim, and the substantive law it 
relates to, is morally justifiable.  
Expanding on the reputational dimension introduced above, we can say that 
where the bark jurisdiction and the substantive law it relates to is morally 
justifiable, it is perilous for the target of the claim to ignore it; and where the bark 
jurisdiction and/or the substantive law it relates to is not morally justifiable, it is 
perilous for the country making the claim to make the jurisdictional claim.  
Revealing my idealistic (or even naïve) side, it may perhaps be said that this 
should have the dual positive effect of encouraging restraint amongst countries 
considering making too broad extraterritorial claims and should encourage 
compliance with rules that otherwise may have been ignored amongst the targets 
of the extraterritorial claims.  But in Bygrave’s later writings we find a statement 
that should remind us that the landscape before us is more complicated than I so 
far have let on.  
Having noted how “[d]emarcation of values and ideals is an integral element of 
all law,”139 Bygrave states that “posturing without punch” may be particularly 
counterproductive to the general respect for those values where “the values are not 
otherwise widely respected in practice.”140 
In the above, I have linked the moral dimension of the extraterritorial claim 
with the morality of the substantive law. This has given us two options:  
(x) Extraterritorial claim moral 
and substantive law moral. 
(y) Extraterritorial claim immoral 
and/or substantive law immoral. 
The reality, however, is of course better described in the following matrix: 
(a) Extraterritorial claim moral 
and substantive law moral. 
(b) Extraterritorial claim immoral 
and substantive law moral. 
(c) Extraterritorial claim moral 
and substantive law immoral. 
(d) Extraterritorial claim immoral 
and substantive law immoral. 
This somewhat increased sophistication forces us to consider the matter before 
 
137. KOHL, supra note 1, at 205. 
138. Id. 
139. Bygrave, Data privacy law and the Internet, supra note 122, at 277. 
140. Id. 
 A Jurisprudential Justification for Extraterritoriality in (Private) International Law 
563 
us with greater precision.  How do we view bark jurisdiction in these scenarios?  
Scenario a poses no problems—it remains the case that where both the 
extraterritorial claim and the substantive law it is seeking to give application to 
are morally justifiable, it is perilous for the target of the claim to ignore it.  The 
scenarios labeled b, c, and d are, however, more complicated.  Most interestingly, 
perhaps it could be said that an immoral extraterritorial claim, such as where 
there is a lacking nexus between the action and the claim, may undermine the 
substantive law it seeks to make applicable even where that substantive law is 
morally justifiable.  I will happily concede that in such a situation (scenario b in 
the matrix above), bark jurisdiction is inappropriate; but then so is bite 
jurisdiction.  The same can be said for scenarios c and d.  It is only for situations 
like scenario a that I advocate bark jurisdiction.   
But perhaps the expanded matrix is also too simplistic to do justice to the 
complicated matter before us. We may get closer to a satisfactory model if we 












































This matrix acknowledges that it is too simplistic to view an extraterritorial 
claim as either moral or immoral; rather, the grey zone may be quite dominant 
with only limited black and white areas.  
One last problem must be confronted before we draw any conclusions from the 
discussion here—does bark jurisdiction fit with the need to provide individuals 
with an effective remedy?  As noted by Kuner in private correspondence,141 one of 
 
141. E-mail from Dr. Christopher Kuner, Honorary Professor at the University of Cambridge and the 
University of Copenhagen, to Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Professor and Co-Director, Centre for 
Commercial Law at Bond University (Mar. 19, 2014) (on file with author). 
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the fundamentals of, for example, European human rights law is that individuals 
must have a legal remedy for violations of the law (at least in terms of the 
fundamental rights provided under such human rights law).  For example, 
according to Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”142  If 
the law-maker enacts legislation that it knows in advance cannot be enforced and 
thus provides no feasible legal remedy, does that not raise questions about whether 
it has complied with basic principles of legality? 
This issue is both of the greatest significance and of the highest complexity.  
And importantly, as Kuner also has brought to my attention, it is not merely an 
academic matter; it is a matter that has distinct practical implications.143  Further, 
it is not merely a European problem.  Article 3 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:  
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity;  
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have 
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative 
or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy;  
 
142. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 13, Nov. 4 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/ html/005.htm. 
143. Email from Dr. Christopher Kuner, supra note 141. See also Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine, and Natural Resources, 2014 
E.C.R. I___ (“In the second place, it should be added that that directive [Directive 2006/24/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated 
or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC] does not 
require the data in question to be retained within the European Union, with the result that it 
cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3) of the Charter, by an 
independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security, as referred 
to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully ensured. Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU 
law, is an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data . . . ”), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=145562&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=687205. 
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(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted.144  
Furthermore, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states that: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.145 
It seems possible to argue that the phrase “to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant” expresses two separate requirements rather than a 
double requirement.146  As I have argued elsewhere,147 from that vantage point 
each signatory state has an obligation to provide legal protection against unlawful 
attacks on the rights of people subject to its jurisdiction and those present within 
its territory, regardless of the origins of the attacks.  
This interpretation is supported in ICCPR General Comment 16: “Provision 
must also be made for everyone effectively to be able to protect himself against any 
unlawful attacks that do occur and to have an effective remedy against those 
responsible.”148  If, for example, the reputation of a person in state B is negatively 
affected by material posted on a website in state A, state B is arguably failing to 
provide “an effective remedy against those responsible” unless its laws provide for 
extraterritorial jurisdictional and legislative claims over the offender in state A.  
However, what is then the impact of difficulties in enforcing the extraterritorial 
claim?  It can, of course, be said that even such a jurisdictional claim does not in 
itself provide “an effective remedy against those responsible” unless it can also be 
enforced.  However, it would seem counterintuitive if state B in our example was to 
be required by international law to do more than what lies in its power to do.  
Parallels may be seen here to Dworkin’s reasoning in a recent article in which he 
presented his interesting new philosophy for international law: 
If a state can help to facilitate an international order in a way that 
would improve the legitimacy of its own coercive government, then 
 
144. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 21/62, art. 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/21/2200 (Mar. 23, 1966), available at http://www.un-documents.net/a21r2200.htm.  
145. Id. art. 2(1). 
146. Id. (emphasis added). See generally MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS (2d ed. 1993). 
147. See, e.g., Svantesson, The Extraterritoriality of E.U. Data Privacy Law, supra note 106, at 78. 
148. UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The 
Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and 
Reputation (April 8, 1988), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f922.html 
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it has a political obligation to do what it can in that direction.  Of 
course that obligation demands only what, in the circumstances, is 
feasible.  It does not require any state to ignore the division of the 
world into distinct states and suppose that it has the same 
responsibilities to citizens of other nations as it has to its own.149 
Perhaps the issue is a rather simple one after all; state B in our example has 
two alternatives.  The first option is to make an extraterritorial claim, knowing 
that it may have a mere bark effect.  The second option is to refrain from giving 
extraterritorial effect to its laws regulating defamation.  If state B adopts this 
latter option, it avoids the criticism of having made law it cannot back up with an 
effective remedy.  However, it is of course no closer to complying with the 
requirements of the ECHR or the ICCPR—after all, it then does not even make an 
attempt to uphold the relevant fundamental human rights against attacks 
originating abroad as it is obligated to do.  Surely the conclusion must be that, at 
the minimum, it cannot be more wrong to try but fail to provide effective remedy 
than it is not to even try.  If anything, one would think that in this setting bark 
jurisdiction is a better option than is complete and unconditional surrender to 
extraterritorial attacks.  
In light of the above, my conclusion is that jurisdictional claims that can be seen 
as bite-less bark do indeed serve a function.  Perhaps it could be said that “bark 
jurisdiction” signals a perceived right to regulate a particular matter while 
acknowledging the lacking ability to regulate that matter.  Viewed from this 
perspective, I argue that bark jurisdiction has both jurisprudential legitimacy and 
practical utility.  And while I would happily lead the charge in any attempt to 
subject extraterritoriality to appropriate checks and balances—not least as it 
applies to the Internet—I do not think an insistence on effective enforceability 
amounts to an appropriate yardstick for extraterritoriality.  
V. A New Theoretical Framework for Assessing the Legitimacy 
of Extraterritoriality 
The above has hopefully made some progress towards filling the gap I identified 
in the introduction; that is, the lack of attention given so far to the jurisprudential 
underpinnings of extraterritoriality and that of the enforcement difficulties 
commonly associated with extraterritorial claims.  Put simplistically, perhaps too 
simplistically, it may be said that in pointing to the option of domestic 
enforceability of extraterritorial claims through so-called market destroying 
measures, the legal positivist’s insistence on legal rules being backed by legal 
 
149. Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, supra note 49, at 17. 
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sanctions has been satisfied.  The analysis above ought to also bring joy to the legal 
realists and pragmatists, as both the reputational dimension of extraterritoriality 
and the market destroying measures are factually potent sanctions.  Finally, I am 
hopeful that the above may also be pleasing to adherents to some form of natural 
law theory in that I have identified a strong link between the legitimacy of 
extraterritorial claims and the morality of the goal such claims pursue.   
Be that as it may, I think it also important to try to make use of this 
jurisprudential advancement to draw out something of more clearly practical 
value.  To that end, I will venture to outline the backbones of a new theoretical 
framework for assessing the legitimacy of extraterritoriality.  Importantly, I am 
here departing from the idea or concept of “jurisprudential legitimacy” that I have 
consistently discussed above in favor of a broader—wishy-washy some would 
“legitimately” say—concept of “legitimacy.”  While the former is easily defined to 
refer to whether or not an extraterritorial claim is consistent with the various legal 
theories discussed, the latter concept of legitimacy does not allow itself to be so 
easily pinned down.  As noted by Reed, “‘legitimacy’ has a range of meanings.”150 
To avoid entering into, and indeed getting bogged down or even lost in, the rich 
literature of Internet governance, political science, and regulatory theory, I will 
here attach a most simplistic notion to the term legitimacy used in its broader 
sense.  In doing so, I focus on consequences; a legitimate extraterritorial claim may 
be pursued while an illegitimate extraterritorial claim ought not be pursued.  It is 
then through the eight principles I outline below that the factors taken into 
account in deciding whether such a claim is legitimate or not is fleshed out.  Thus, 
in discussing legitimacy in a broader sense, I am essentially pointing to a theory of 
morality about the circumstances in which something ought or ought not to 
happen.   
Before I proceed to outline the backbones of a new theoretical framework for 
assessing the legitimacy of extraterritoriality a brief detour is necessary, allowing 
me to outline the biases that have colored my thinking on this topic.  First, while I 
disagree with several of Fuller’s propositions, it is in my mind clear that Fuller 
points to something of the greatest significance to our information age when he 
states: 
Communication is something more than a means of staying alive.  
It is a way of being alive. . . . [I]f I were asked, then, to discern one 
central indisputable principle of what may be called substantive 
natural law – Natural Law with capital letters – I would find it in 
the injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of 
 
150. REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 78. 
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the channels of communication by which men convey to one 
another what they perceive, feel, and desire.151 
This central role of communication must, in my view, necessarily be borne in 
mind when we discuss extraterritorial claims in relation to Internet conduct.  Put 
simply, I am admittedly and openly pro-communication across borders. 
Given what has transpired from the discussion above, I propose the following 
eight principles—or dare I in Fuller’s footsteps call it, “inner morality of 
extraterritoriality”—to guide the assessment of the legitimacy of extraterritorial 
claims: 
Principle 1: The legitimacy of an extraterritorial claim does not solely, or 
always, depend on the likelihood of its successful enforcement; but it must 
always be assessed in light of the substantive law it seeks to make 
applicable. 
Principle 2: Extraterritorial claims are disruptive and should only be 
made where the goals they are used to pursue survive a proportionality 
test, comparing those goals with the disruptions they will, or may, cause.152 
Principle 3: Before an extraterritorial claim is made, less disruptive 
alternatives must be considered. 
Principle 4: The application of extraterritorial claims must be guided by 
the “consequence-focused approach” and be sensitive to the object’s 
“contextual legal system,” including any contradictions or clashes between 
different rights and/or duties. 
Principle 5: Extraterritorial claims must be as geographically limited as 
the goals they are used to pursue allow. 
Principle 6: Extraterritorial claims must be as limited as to subject 
matter as the goals they are used to pursue allow. 
Principle 7: Extraterritorial claims must be as limited as to whom they 
affect as the goals they are used to pursue allow. 
Principle 8: Extraterritorial claims must be communicated in a manner 
and form that makes it possible for those (potentially) affected by the claim 
to become familiar with the rules they are exposed to. 
The eight principles outlined above ought to be useful both for legislators 
 
151. FULLER, supra note 15, at 186.  
152. The proportionality test referred to in Principle 2 ordinarily requires that an 
“Extraterritoriality Impact Assessment” is carried out so that the claim’s potential disruptive 
effect may be properly assessed. Guidance on this may be drawn from other areas such as so-
called Privacy Impact Assessments. Where the extraterritorial claim will be made in 
legislation, the “Extraterritoriality Impact Assessment” can usefully be included in the 
travaux preparatoires. Where instead the claim is made through a court judgment, the judge 
ought to include the “Extraterritoriality Impact Assessment” in the judgment. See, e.g., Roger 
Clarke, An Evaluation of Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance Documents, 1 INT’L DATA PRIV. 
L. 111 (2011). 
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considering giving extraterritorial effect to a certain law and for courts faced with 
the task of assessing whether an extraterritorial claim should be upheld.  
As to the matter of courts using these principles, some will no doubt be tempted 
to conclude that the principles appear to provide the courts with too much 
discretion.  However, one need only remind oneself of the common reference to 
ordre public or public policy in jurisdictional matters to see that courts are no 
strangers to discretion in this context. 
The larger issue may be whether a person subject to an extraterritorial claim 
may protest that claim based on a perceived failure to adhere to these eight 
principles.  It could be argued that such a failure robs the extraterritorial claim of 
any rational ground for asserting that a person can have a moral obligation to obey 
the claim, as Fuller may have asserted, if we allow ourselves the extravagance of 
assuming that he would be willing to place these eight principles on similar footing 
with his eight principles of an inner morality of law.153  Or placed in Kantian 
terms, such a failure may mean that the extraterritorial claim lacks legitimacy to 
the degree of bringing obedience to it beyond the Categorical Imperative.154  
Indeed, at least in cases where the extraterritorial claim offends our genuinely 
held notions of fundamental personal or political rights, Dworkin may perhaps 
have been willing to allow the object of the claim to resist it as a form of civil 
disobedience.155  
Whether this is so is something I will leave for a later day when the discussion 
of extraterritoriality has matured.  It suffices for now to note that these eight 
principles may provide useful guidance for the “international law doctrine of 
selective legal compliance” I have proposed elsewhere.156  That is, in assessing 
whether certain actors, such as globally active Internet intermediaries, ought to 
enjoy protection shielding them from having to comply with all the laws from 
around the world that prima facie apply to them, these eight principles could be a 
useful yardstick.  After all, where a state makes an extraterritorial claim that does 
not meet the test set by the eight principles above, the discussion here may 
support, or even legitimize, my proposed protection through a doctrine of selective 
legal compliance. 
 
153. FULLER, supra note 15, at 39.  
154. Kenneth R. Westphal, Kant on the State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged 'Anti-
Revolutionary' Writings, reprinted in SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT AND LAW 201, 
219-20 (2006). 
155. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 214-15 (1977). 
156. See Svantesson, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 30. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
The tale of how King Knut den store (Canute the Great), ruler of England, 
Denmark, Norway, and parts of Sweden, commanded the waves to stop rolling is 
well known.  And the outcome—the unsurprising fact that the waves disregarded 
his command—is equally well known.  This has led to widespread ridicule of King 
Knut, and the said event is frequently (mis)used as an example of foolish, arrogant, 
and futile attempts to prevent unstoppable forces.157  Assuming the tale has any 
truth to it at all, the reality seems to be that King Knut did what he did in an 
attempt to demonstrate how limited his power was compared to that of the god 
people commonly believed in at that time in Europe.158  
It is no doubt tempting to misapply the tale of King Knut also to the context of 
extraterritorial claims over Internet activities—those who make such claims, 
conscious of the unlikely enforceability, may indeed be seen as brothers and sisters 
of King Knut in the misunderstood version of the tale.  However, in this article I 
have sought to show that extraterritorial claims, even where their prospects of 
being enforced are dim, have support in several schools of jurisprudential thought.  
I have also illustrated that a country may make legitimate and meaningful 
extraterritorial bark claims.  Thus, in many ways this article provides support for 
extraterritoriality.  However, as also hinted at above, it must always be 
remembered that extraterritorial claims should only be made where they and the 
substantive law they enable the application of are morally justifiable.  Thus, on a 
practical level, whenever a state considers making a claim of extraterritoriality, it 
should always consider at least three questions.  First, it should investigate 
whether its domestic laws allow for the extraterritorial claim to be made.  Second, 
it should investigate whether international law allows for the extraterritorial claim 
to be made.  These first two questions seem uncontroversial, mundane even, and 
are typically part of standard conceptions of how we approach extraterritoriality.  
However, as is signaled by the framework I put forth above, the inquiry must not 
stop there.  A state contemplating making an extraterritorial claim, as well as 
courts contemplating whether to uphold an extraterritorial claim, should also 
 
157. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, Jackboots on the Infobahn: Clipping the Wings of Freedom, 4 WIRED 
(Feb. 9, 1993), available at 
http://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/infobahn_ jackboots.html (bringing 
up “the folly of King Canute” in the context of arguably futile attempts to stop the use of 
encryption). 
158. Kathryn Westcott, Is King Canute Misunderstood?, BBC NEWS (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/magazine-13524677. See also James Baldwin, King Canute on the 
Seashore, in THE BOOK OF VIRTUES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE: A TREASURY OF GREAT MORAL 
STORIES (William J. Bennett ed., 1995), available at 
http://canute2.sealevelrise.info/slr/Story%20of%20Canute. 
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consider whether it ought to avoid pursuing the extraterritorial claim in light of 
considerations such as: 
• What can be achieved through the extraterritorial claim? 
• How will such a claim impact other states?159 
• How will those other states react to that impact? 
• What advantages can be gained? 
• What negative results may follow? 
• Are there any alternatives to making the extraterritorial claim? 
• Is the extraterritorial claim the option having the most 
favorable consequences for the future? 
• Is there any way in which the reach of the extraterritorial claim 
can be geographically limited without losing the effect it is 
aimed at?  
• Is there any way in which the reach of the extraterritorial claim 
can be limited as to subject matter without losing the effect it is 
aimed at?  
• Is there any way in which the reach of the extraterritorial claim 
can be limited as to whom it impacts without losing the effect it 
is aimed at?  
• Has the law sought to be applied in an extraterritorial manner 
been communicated in a manner making it accessible to 
foreigners?  
• What substantive law is it that the extraterritorial claim seeks 
to make applicable? 
In the case of a court contemplating whether to uphold an extraterritorial claim, 
the court should also take account of the extent to which the “contextual legal 
system” of the object of the claim includes any contradictions or clashes between 
different rights and/or duties. 
In the end, perhaps the most important thing to remember is that the broader 
the extraterritorial claim, the lower its practical utility, and indeed, the harder it is 
to maintain both its jurisprudential legitimacy and its practical utility. 
  
 
159. Reed goes as far as to suggest that ”enforcement of a state’s laws against a foreign online actor 
makes a negative statement about the laws of the actor’s home state, thereby reducing respect for 
those laws.” REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 17, at 47.  
